City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

9-2018

The Prediction of Personal Narrative on Features of Recovery
Among People with Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders
Beth Vayshenker
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2844
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

THE PREDICTION OF PERSONAL NARRATIVE ON FEAUTRES OF RECOVERY
AMONG PEOPLE WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA-SPECTRUM DISORDERS
by
BETH VAYSHENKER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York
2018

ii

© 2018
BETH VAYSHENKER
All Rights Reserved

iii
The Prediction of Personal Narrative Features on Features of Recovery among People with
Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders
by
Beth Vayshenker
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in
Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Philip T. Yanos
Chair of Examining Committee

Date

Richard Bodnar
Executive Officer
Supervisory Committee:
William H. Gottdiener
Elizabeth L. Jeglic
Bethany L. Leonhardt
Paul H. Lysaker

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iv
ABSTRACT
The Prediction of Personal Narrative Features on Features of Recovery among People with
Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders
by
Beth Vayshenker
Advisor: Professor Philip T. Yanos
Among individuals with schizophrenia, research has demonstrated that in addition to the
positive and negative symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia, the diminishment of the self also
represents an important aspect of the illness (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2010). Research has confirmed
that the self-experience, particularly as measured by the telling of one’s life story through the
Scale to Assess Narrative Development (STAND), is linked to a variety of subjective and
objective recovery outcomes from schizophrenia. While this association has been documented in
different research studies, less is known about the ways in which personal narrative functions to
predict recovery outcomes in a longitudinal design and with a diverse sample. This longitudinal
study included two assessment points, baseline and post-treatment (approximately five months
following baseline assessment), to better evaluate narrative development in a prospective
research design. In a sample of 116 individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, this study
sought to investigate the influences of the self-experience on recovery-related factors (both
subjective and objective). This study sought to research the associations between the selfexperience and others facets of recovery among people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders in
a prospective design, to evaluate the predictive relationship of the self-experience to subjective
and objective recovery indicators and to extend prior results in this area to more diverse samples.
Results indicated that the self-experience revealed associations to psychiatric symptoms, selfesteem, internalize stigma of mental illness, and social and vocational functioning. Baseline
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personal narrative emerged as a significant predictorof coping strategies (problem-centered,
avoidant, neutral) used by study participants as well as overall social functioning. Implications
from these findings suggest that narrative development may show causal relationships to specific
recovery and coping variables, that impaired narrative development may serve as a barrier to
achieving recovery outcomes, and that personal narrative offers unique contributions in
understanding broader deficits faced by individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.
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Chapter 1: Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric disorder that has been traditionally characterized by the
presence of positive symptoms, such as hallucinations, delusions, and disordered thought, and
negative symptoms, such as lack of emotional expression, reduced motivation, anhedonia,
poverty of speech, and, avolition. It has been traditionally regarded to be accompanied by a steep
decline in occupational, educational, and social functioning (American Psychiatric Association,
2013; Cornblatt, Green, Walker, & Mittal, 2009). Known to affect approximately one percent of
the population (Cornblatt et al., 2009) with worldwide prevalence estimates of 21 million people
(World Health Organization, 2015), its presence exacts tremendous costs on family members,
society and most importantly, the people affected by the condition. Researchers estimate that
indirect costs (e.g., unemployment, family caregiving time, premature mortality, reduced work
productivity), direct health costs (e.g., medication, service delivery, long-term hospital stays),
and direct non-heath costs (e.g., law enforcement, research, homeless shelters) related to
schizophrenia total roughly $62.7 billion per year (Kessler et al., 2008). Onset of the disorder
typically occurs in early adulthood whereby individuals experience a “psychotic break” or a
break from reality during which they begin to experience alterations in reality that may include
perceptual disturbances, delusions and social withdrawal.
In 1896, Emil Kraepelin wrote about a disorder called dementia praecox (early dementia),
which later, owing to Eugen Bleuler, came to be known as schizophrenia in 1908 (Bleuler,
1911/1950). Kraepelin conceived of dementia praecox as a degenerative disease that progresses
and worsens through the lifespan. He viewed the condition as distinct from manic-depression and
he identified three forms: hebephrenia, catatonia and paranoia. Although Kraepelin remained
largely pessimistic about recovery from dementia praecox, he believed that improvements from
the condition were attainable: “Improvements are not at all unusual, which in practice may be
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considered equivalent to cures.”(Kraepelin, 1917, p. 29). However, he expounded on several case
studies to note that any observed improvement would last temporarily to be undoubtedly
followed by more severe relapses. Bleuler conceived the group of schizophrenias as several
diseases unified by “the ‘splitting’ of the different psychic functions” (p. 8). That is, Bleuler
believed that the most defining characteristic of schizophrenia included the lack of unity in
personality organization, manifesting as the disintegration of directed thought and action. Bleuler
wrote, “… one set of complexes dominates the personality for a time, while other groups of ideas
or drives are only partially worked out, and fragments of ideas are connected in an illogical way
to constitute a new idea” (p. 9). This led to Bleuler’s classification of fundamental symptoms
including associational and affective disturbances and ambivalence, indicative of lapses in
associations between affect, behavior, and cognition. Emanating from these fundamental
symptoms, Bleuler noted the secondary manifestations of the disease including hallucinations,
delusions, catatonia, and social withdrawal. Though Bleuler’s conception of schizophrenia
encompassed “several diseases” called schizophrenia, Kraepelin’s perspective introduced the oft
cited notion that people with schizophrenia are destined to experience lifetime disability and
degeneration that follows an irreversible downward course with a poor prognosis. Indeed, this
model of schizophrenia continues to remain prominent among some academic circles, and in the
eyes of the public (Corrigan, Mueser, Bond, Drake, & Solomon, 2008).
Kraepelin and Bleuler tremendously shaped and affected the way people understand,
research, and work with individuals living with schizophrenia today. They offered a nosology for
schizophrenia and developed models of understanding that, regardless of their current validity,
influenced the research conducted for years to come and laid the basis from which other theories
about schizophrenia were built.
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Chapter 2: Recovery in Schizophrenia
Over the last 30 years, the clinical landscape has shifted toward recognizing that
schizophrenia represents a heterogeneous disorder with heterogeneous outcomes (APA, 2013).
Traditional notions of inevitable decline and lifelong disability in the course of schizophrenia
have been challenged by longitudinal empirical investigations of recovery and by experiential
accounts of recovery from persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. The accumulation of personal
accounts of recovery from schizophrenia (Chamerblin, 1978; Deegan, 1988; Saks, 2007) paired
with mounting scientific evidence that disputed the Kraepelinian notion of a degenerative course
began to change and transform the types of research conducted, including the variables studied,
and the types of services offered to individuals with schizophrenia. This section will provide an
overview of the historical underpinnings of recovery, the current conceptualizations from the
literature on recovery, and empirical investigations of recovery.
Recovery: A brief historical context
Recovery, as an aspiration, was evident in the writings from the early 19th century, during
a brief period of humane treatment toward patients in mental asylums. This form of treatment,
introduced by Philippe Pinel, was based on providing patients kindness, dignity and respect
through treatment in mental asylums and on fostering genuine relationships with staff (Grob,
1994; Miller & Blanc, 1967). The approach encouraged caretakers to view patients as individuals
who, with restoration, might have the opportunity to re-enter the community (Mueser &
VandenBos, 2010). Some might argue that current discourse on recovery revives some of the
elements from this era. Indeed, one can read the mission statement of the Friends Asylum in
1813 to see that some of the ideas and constructs studied now were also relevant over 200 years
ago: the facility “…intended to furnish, besides requisite medical aid, such tender, sympathetic
attention as may soothe their agitated minds, and under the Divine Blessing, facilitate their
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recovery” (Friends Hospital, 2014). Through the following 150 years, these concepts were
largely laid to rest (at least on the systems level) until groups of individuals diagnosed with
mental illnesses who were negatively affected by the mental health system, formed the mental
health consumer/psychiatric survivor movement (herein referred to as the consumer movement).
Inspired by the zeitgeist of the 1960s/1970s (e.g., civil rights movement; rise of
feminism), the consumer movement aimed to empower and organize individuals labeled by the
mental health system as “patients,” who suffered iatrogenic consequences at the hands of the
mental health system. Within this movement, advocates rejected psychiatry’s treatment of people
with mental disorders and they sought to reclaim their own agency, which they believed was lost
to the effects of being a “mental patient.” Pioneers of the movement, like Judi Chamberlin,
advocated for “ex-patients” to build an alternative network of support with consciousness-raising
activities as a primary goal of the movement (Chamberlin, 1979). As with other political
movements, the consumer movement had to contend with differences of opinions within the
movement, with regard to many key issues, such as the extent of involvement of individuals not
affected by the mental health system in the movement (i.e., professionals, family members), the
overarching movement’s goal (e.g., creation of an alternative system of care, collaboration with
existing systems) and stances on professional psychiatric treatment (e.g., rejection of medical
model altogether; Tomes, 2006). Nonetheless, the principles of self-determination, self-directed
care, and full citizenship rights for ex-patients were embraced and promoted by the various
factions of the consumer movement (Chamberlin, 1990). The movement’s mission predated
future calls by professionals and other stakeholders for a more inclusive, client-centered model
of care, facilitated in recovery oriented environments.

5
The consumer movement humanized the use of the word recovery and, though they did
not believe that people could return to a pre-illness state due to the irreparable damage caused by
the mental health system, they believed that people could recover from the effects of mental
illness and the detrimental mental health system by reclaiming control over their lives, in spite of
the presence of enduring symptoms (Chamberlin, 1978; Davidson, O’Connell, Tondora,
Lawless, & Evans, 2005). That is, the consumer movement meaningfully and effectively
introduced, described and advocated for the inclusion of a recovery philosophy within mental
health services. Cogently described by Patricia Deegan, a consumer and psychologist (1988),
recovery is an ongoing process that “does not refer to an absence of pain or struggle,” but instead
an acceptance of one’s limitations as a way of discovering new possibilities about oneself (p.
56). Members of the consumer movement sought to emphasize that the concept of recovery is
not an endpoint or outcome but rather that recovery encompasses a lifestyle of hope, willingness,
and intentional action (Deegan, 1988). Consistent with the idea of recovery as a process, some
people have asserted that to agree upon a definition for recovery is futile, that the recovery
process “defies definition” (Davidson et al., 2005, p. 483). The consumer movement and its
assertion that people can live purposeful and meaningful lives were largely influenced by the
Independent Living movement (Davidson et al., 2005; Deegan, 1992). The Independent Living
movement was founded by people with physical disabilities in the late 1970s and their guiding
principles included having the opportunity to fail and learn from their mistakes; viewing their
barriers as ones posed by the environment (as opposed to the individual); having their voices
heard and respected and believing that self-help provided unique support in ways that
professional help could not (Deegan, 1992). The Independent Living movement provided a
framework from which the consumer movement’s own belief system and philosophy developed
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and evolved. It was through these varying forces and influences such as the physical disability
consumer movement, the civil rights movement, and the women’s rights movement that the term
recovery came to represent a concept of self-determination, agency, and self-help that
significantly guided the way recovery was studied in consumer and scientific communities.
As noted by Bellack (2006) and Jacobsen and Curtis (2000), recovery as defined by the
consumer movement and the scientific community come from different traditions with different
motivations, which may help to explain why the word has taken on myriad definitions over time.
The consumer movement was largely driven by sociopolitical aims, seeking to expose the
violations of civil and human rights within psychiatric settings while simultaneously advocating
for the return of power to the previously disempowered (i.e., consumers). Within this framework,
it stands to reason that values of self-determination and empowerment (personal and group) lie at
the core of what recovery means among members of the consumer movement. In contrast, the
scientific definition of the word recovery is in the service of increasing the knowledge-base
about schizophrenia with the overarching goal of improving outcomes in schizophrenia. With
these goals in mind, recovery is perceived as an outcome with measurable components.
The converging evidence from long-term outcome studies coupled with voices from the
consumer-led movement began to move the field toward new understandings of how to think
about and study recovery from schizophrenia. This work paved the way for researchers to
theorize about and empirically investigate constructs linked to recovery. The literature base on
recovery has swelled, with researchers examining and studying associations of recovery,
particularly ways to classify objective and subjective indicators of recovery.
Empirical investigations of recovery
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Scholars, consumers, practitioners and other stakeholders posit that recovery from mental
illness can take many forms, which, according to Resnick, Rosenheck, and Lehman (2004), may
be objective or subjective in nature. One leading definition offered by Anthony (1993), describes
recovery as “a deeply personal, unique process of changing one’s attitudes, values, feelings,
goals, skills and/or roles…even with limitations caused by illness.” (p. 527).
The study of recovery and its many facets matter immensely, especially as the mental
health system moves away from a paternalistic model of care (Grob, 1994) to a model of shared
decision-making and client centered care. The ability to identify and measure variables that relate
to recovery remain essential to designing targeted interventions that affect change in areas
central to mental health recovery. Describing and defining recovery has been addressed through
many vantage points and this section will overview some of the empirical evidence seeking to
operationalize what recovery means.
Emerging from the clinical research field, researchers have tended to focus on remission,
(i.e., the absence of symptoms), to constitute recovery. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (2013) defines remission as “a period of time after a previous
episode during which no disorder-specific symptoms are present” (p. 100). A group of
prominent schizophrenia researchers reached a preliminary consensus definition for remission,
proposing that mild ratings on several symptomatic features as measured by structured
instruments (delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized/catatonic behavior, and
negative symptoms) for a period of at least six months constitutes remission (Andreasen et al.,
2005). Other conceptions of recovery attend to functional aspects such as a return to work or
school and the ability to live independently (Harvey & Bellack, 2009; Jaeger, Berns, & Czobor,
2003). Lieberman, Kopelowicz, Ventura, and Gutkind (2002) proposed specific recovery criteria

8
that include both clinical and functional criteria: clinically nonsignificant positive and negative
symptoms, at least part time involvement in work or school activities, the capacity to care for
one’s day to day needs (money management, shopping, etc.) and socialization with others at least
weekly for a duration of two years. Thus, objective aspects of recovery represent one component
of recovery that is deemed essential in studying outcomes of recovery.
Definitions of the subjective elements of recovery (or personal recovery) offered by
consumers and researchers tend to explore concepts such as self-esteem, hopefulness, autonomy,
self-determination, meaningful activity, redefining of the self, and receiving support from others
(Davidson, et al., 2005; Davidson & Strauss, 1992). Indeed, based on data collected from a
sample of 1075 adults with severe mental illness, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses
supported a four factor model of personal recovery, comprised of mental health knowledge
including treatment options, hope and optimism, life satisfaction, and empowerment (Resnick,
Fontana, Lehman, & Rosenheck, 2005). Similarly, in a systematic review of 97 papers focusing
on the experiential conceptualization of personal recovery from mental illness, Leamy, Bird, Le
Boutillier, Williams, and Slade (2011), identified five recovery processes that are of great import
to the future study of personal recovery: connectedness; hope and optimism for the future;
identity; meaning and empowerment. The authors also contend that scales measuring these
domains should continue to be developed as part of an effort to assess subjective and experiential
facets of recovery. Taken together, these multidimensional components comprise variants of
recovery that have enabled future research to explore and develop methodologically rigorous
ways to examine these concepts and relate them to meaningful outcomes for people with
schizophrenia.
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Some researchers have suggested that the subjective dimension of recovery may be better
represented and refined by two separate but related components: one’s subjective appraisal of
external circumstances and one’s subjective experience of themselves (Lysaker & Buck, 2008).
External features refer to one’s perceived satisfaction with resources, future possibilities, and
community participation whereas internal features relate to one’s identity and sense of self such
as stigma rejection, belief in one’s ability to endure through challenges, and a balanced personal
narrative. Lysaker and Buck (2008) believe that distinguishing between external and internal
forms of recovery remains important because “perceptions of the external quality of one’s life is
not equivalent to the experience of one’s root identity or the meaning one makes of those
external qualities.” (p. 62).
The body of literature surrounding recovery continues to grow as the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) and other federal agencies purport to
embrace the concept, aiming to back and support treatment services advocating a recovery
orientation (President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, 2003). Yet, one gap in the
literature consisted of whether these various dimensions of recovery (subjective, objective)
interacted with each other. Put another way, there was little empirical evidence investigating, for
example, whether someone could live a personally fulfilling and meaningful life with the
presence of psychiatric symptoms or alternatively, whether someone exhibiting no psychiatric
symptoms would automatically experience him/herself as a meaningful agent connected to the
world. To address this, Resnick et al. (2004) analyzed the correlates of recovery to examine
whether symptoms, demographic characteristics and utilization of psychiatric services showed
any bearing on self-reported personal recovery. From their cross-sectional study of 825 people
with schizophrenia, the authors found that features of recovery showed significant relationships
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to the presence of some psychiatric symptoms, suggesting that, although objective and subjective
recovery indicators are conceptually distinct, they may relate to one another in clinically
meaningful ways. More specifically, as depressive symptoms increased in severity, self-reported
hope, life satisfaction, empowerment, and mental health knowledge diminished. In contrast to
symptoms of depression, psychotic symptoms only showed a significant negative relationship to
life satisfaction (i.e., as psychotic symptoms increased, life satisfaction decreased). More
recently, in a meta-analysis of 37 studies comparing clinical and personal recovery variables,
despite significant heterogeneity across studies, Van Eck and colleagues (2018) found a smallmoderate association between psychiatric symptoms and personal recovery, hope, and
empowerment. Of the psychiatric symptoms examined, affective symptoms demonstrated
stronger correlations to personal recovery (r = -.34, e.g., Recovery Assessment Scale) and hope
(r = -.24, e.g., BHS). Additionally, the researchers expected a stronger association between
functioning (as assessed by the GAF) and personal recovery, however, their findings revealed a
small direct association, supposing that the GAF may be an incomplete measure of community
functioning. These investigations make an empirical case for the incorporation of both objective
and subjective recovery factors in the service delivery for schizophrenia.
Roe, Mashiach-Eizenberg, and Lysaker (2011) explored the association of objective
recovery factors (i.e., psychiatric symptoms, global assessment functioning) to subjective
recovery factors (i.e., personal confidence, hope, willingness to ask for help, lack of symptom
domination, and depending on others). A total of 159 participants with schizophrenia spectrum
disorders completed measures of personal recovery, psychiatric symptoms, perceived social
support, loneliness, and quality of life. The authors did not find a significant relationship
between subjective elements of recovery and objective indicators across all participants, which
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may suggest that the experience of personal recovery may be distinct from objective recovery,
like symptom remission. However, the association of psychiatric symptoms to mental health
recovery became statistically significant when age of illness onset was entered as a moderator.
That is, for participants reporting onset of symptoms before age 18, the greater the symptom
severity, the reduced self-reported mental health recovery. From their findings, it is evident that
one individual may experience themselves in recovery despite the presence of psychotic
symptoms, while another individual may show full symptom remission and report a lack of
changes in components of mental health recovery. Similarly, in a cross-sectional study conducted
by Andresen, Caputi, and Oades (2010), the results revealed that subjective dimensions of
recovery showed little relationship to the objective indicators of recovery examined in this study
and that, though clinical measures did not improve with self-identified stages of recovery,
personal measures of recovery did improve with stages of recovery (moratorium, awareness,
preparation, rebuilding, growth; Andresen, Oades, & Caputi, 2003). Moreover, Macpherson and
his colleagues (2015) applied factor analytic techniques to better clarify the way objective and
subjective aspects of recovery relate to each other and change over time. In a group of 403
outpatients with psychosis, factor analysis identified three distinguishable factors – patient-rated
personal recovery (hope, well-being, confidence); patient-rated clinical recovery (patient rated
needs assessment; quality of life; researcher-rated psychiatric symptoms) and staff-rated clinical
recovery (GAF, social disability, staff-rated needs assessment). Only patient-rated personal
recovery improved over one year, which suggests that personal recovery may substantially differ
from objective recovery dimensions. However, Strauss, Sandt, Catalano, and Allen, (2012) found
that higher levels of negative symptoms (particularly avolition and apathy) and depression, but
not positive symptoms, were significant predictors of decreased psychological well-being
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(purpose, growth, and mastery) in a group of 56 outpatients with schizophrenia. In another
longitudinal study of 306 individuals with schizophrenia that evaluated the association of
psychiatric symptoms to quality of life, as defined by the gap between a person’s expectations
and achievements, the researchers found a small negative correlation between two components
used to measure quality of life, expectations and current position in life, and a decrease in
negative symptoms but not for positive symptoms (Wilson-d’Almeida et al., 2013). Extending
the work on quality of life, based on cross-sectional data collected from a sample of 68 veterans
with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, other researchers found that individuals with high levels
of subjective recovery and positive symptoms fared better on quality of life domains than
individuals with low levels of subjective recovery and mild positive symptoms (Kukla, Lysaker,
& Roe, 2014). These findings confirmed the notion that recovery can take many forms, and that
elements beyond symptom reduction can facilitate social functioning (Roe et al., 2011). Despite
the growing research attention to examining and comparing these facets of recovery, much of the
research has compared only symptoms as objective measures with subjective recovery measures.
Less attention has been spent exploring other facets of objective recovery, like social
functioning, with subjective recovery dimensions and thus, future research is warranted in this
area. This body of literature suggests that certain objective indicators of recovery, like negative
symptoms, show associations to some subjective indicators of recovery; however, it remains
clear that these elements capture different features of recovery that ought to be studied in
tandem.
In line with Lysaker and Buck’s (2008) thinking regarding differences between selfappraisals and appraisals of life events, other researchers suggest that the idea of recovery as an
individual process may overlook the social factors and structures that facilitate or hinder the
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recovery process (Topor, Borg, Girolamo, & Davidson, 2009; Yanos, Knight, & Roe, 2006).
Further, Yanos et al. (2006) wrote about the impact of social factors such as rules and resources
that have a bearing on the choices people make in their environments. Accounting for the reality
that people recover in interpersonal and social contexts, subject to positive and negative societal
forces, opens pathways for research questions that can examine important interactions between
the individual’s experience of themselves as beings in the world.
As previously noted, the definition of recovery remains broad and multidimensional,
capturing the many pieces that comprise the human experience of what it means to carry out a
life filled with purpose and meaning in the face of continuing distress. Although the field does
not have (and, arguably, ought not to have) a standardized definition for recovery, some common
features cutting across the definitions include optimism, discussion of illness, and discovering a
renewed sense of self (Davidson et al., 2005). For some people, a recovered life may mean
remaining free of distressing symptoms, while for others it may mean living independently and
possessing close relationships. As some researchers have posited, recovery from schizophrenia
implies changes in the experience of the self which may indicate that as people enter recovery or
recover, they “might see themselves now as entitled to make sense of their lives and begin to
reshape a personal account of their strengths and weaknesses” (Lysaker & Buck, 2008, p. 62).
That is, through the process of recovery, the experience of the self may shift (e.g., self as passive
observer to self as active agent) in ways that begin to transform aspects of identity. Thus, the
way in which one experiences the self warrants further exploration as it may contribute to or
hinder recovery. For example, a person identifying with their passive self may struggle to initiate
positive changes in his/her life because s/he views self as passive. This position of the experience
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of the self as it relates to both recovery process and outcome represents a relatively understudied
area in the literature.
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Chapter 3: The Self in Schizophrenia
As reviewed above, changes in the self experience are considered a crucial feature of the
recovery process in schizophrenia. This section will explore the self experience in schizophrenia,
factors affecting one’s sense of self, and methods to quantitatively assess the self experience.
Estroff (1989) wrote about the identity engulfment that may occur: “Schizophrenia is an I am
illness – one that may overtake and redefine the identity of the person” (p. 189). Indeed, in a
qualitative review of 46 papers that focused on describing the experiential process of recovery
from schizophrenia, Andresen et al. (2003) found that over 90% of the 46 papers referenced the
loss of self-identity while suffering from the illness and in recovering from the illness, a redefinition of the self as related to the illness began to emerge. A further exploration of the self in
schizophrenia will provide a framework to understand these shifts in the self position.
From early observations of psychoanalytic writers and thinkers to more recent
researchers and practitioners who have worked with people with schizophrenia, the notion of a
ruptured and fractured sense of self has become fundamental in the accounts reported by
psychiatric professionals and of individuals with lived experience of schizophrenia (Bleuler,
1911/1950; Laing, 1960; Lysaker & Lysaker, 2010; Searles, 1961). Poignantly illustrated in Elyn
Saks’s autobiographical account, The Center Cannot Hold, she wrote about her experiences of
schizophrenia. In her book, she repeatedly refers to a decimation of the self during periods of her
illness: “Your self loses coherence – it’s like a sandcastle with all the sand being washed away”
(Saks, 2007; p. 347). Researchers have noted and probed about how the self – the loss of it or its
survival – reflects and contributes to the overall course of schizophrenia.
Researchers have argued that schizophrenia displays a unique self-disturbance not
explained by neurological deficits and not observed in other psychological disorders (Lysaker,
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Wickett, & Davis, 2005). Sass and Parnas (2001) proposed that schizophrenia, at its core,
involves a fundamental alteration or lapse in one’s subjective experience of the self. They
proposed that two central disturbances include the decline in a person’s sense of awareness and
action (diminished self-affection) and an increase in the awareness of other components of
experience (hyper reflexivity). As explained by Sass and Parnas (2003), diminished selfaffection refers to the loss of connectedness to one’s experience in the world (e.g., thoughts,
feelings, perceptions). Contrary to diminished self-affection, hyper reflexivity alludes to an
exaggerated self-consciousness whereby internal experiences are attributed to external objects
(i.e., thought insertion). These phenomenological researchers attempted to use this framework to
explain how the three “syndromes” present in schizophrenia – positive, negative, and
disorganized symptoms – are a function of reorganizations of consciousness and the self. Their
perspective endeavors to explain that the symptoms of schizophrenia symbolize alterations in the
self experience.
To clarify and compare the multiple perspectives held about alterations in the experience
of the self, P. Lysaker and J. Lysaker (2010) reviewed positions of the self-experience in
schizophrenia from six schools of thought –early psychiatry, existential psychiatry,
psychoanalysis, psychosocial rehabilitation, phenomenology and dialogical psychology. In doing
so, they highlighted that all of the approaches would agree that the self-experience in
schizophrenia is marked by a diminution of the self that feels minimally, if at all, capable of
interacting with the world. Additionally, in order to preserve the remnants of their senses of self,
people may aim to cut off others who may pose a threat to their broken and fragile selves. As
Laing (1960) described a patient’s self experience, “The self, as one patient put it, feels crushed
and mangled even at the exchanges in an ordinary conversation.” (p. 163). Despite convergences,
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the authors pointed out divergences between these modalities such as differing opinions about
when and how disruptions in the self begin to emerge (e.g., prior or post illness onset) and if the
sense of self can be recovered through therapeutic interventions.
Changes in the self in schizophrenia
To make sense of the diminishment of the self that occurs in schizophrenia, it is
important to consider the interaction between changes in the self with the process of recovery.
Lysaker, Davis, and Lysaker (2006) presented the cases of two men with schizophrenia who
experienced “volitional paralysis” and, through the telling of these cases, the authors asserted
that their inability to take action could be accounted for by their unsteady and shaky senses of
self which made it difficult to interact with the world and within themselves. As the men
improved, the authors suggested that the men showed a more integrated sense of self by having
the capacity to acknowledge various aspects of themselves and being able to hold these multiple
selves in mind simultaneously (self as worker, self as messed up) and through this integrated
sense of self, taking action in the world (e.g., getting a job) seemed achievable. This section
highlights the role of self changes in schizophrenia which may be importantly linked to other life
goals and social roles.
Although sense of self was explored in case study methodology for several decades,
Davidson and Strauss (1992) conducted one of the first empirical studies of change in sense of
self in the recovery process. In a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with 66 participants
diagnosed with severe mental illness, they sought to capture how their sense of self bears on their
illness and recovery. They collected these stories to showcase the dynamism with which
participants describe their sense of self over time. The authors noted that nearly all the
participants indicated a “rediscovery and reconstruction of a dynamic sense of self” over time (p.
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134). Within these reconstructed stories, four nonhierarchical, nonlinear aspects emerged that
explained the transformation of the self: (1) realizing a more active sense of self; (2) noting one’s
strengths and weaknesses and the possibility for change; (3) putting the self into action to gather
evidence that may reflect the redefined sense of self as active and self-directed and (4) appealing
to the self as a safe haven in moments of psychiatric distress or external stress (e.g., stigma).
Extending the work of Davidson and Strauss (1992), Roe (2001) published qualitative findings
collected from a group of 41 individuals with schizophrenia who transitioned from inpatient care
back to the community over one year. As reflected in the title of his article “Progressing from
Patienthood to Personhood across the Multidimensional Outcomes in Schizophrenia and Related
Disorders,” the journey from patienthood to personhood is complex, nonlinear and rocky,
involving new understandings and relationships to domains such as work, socialization, and
mental health treatment. These experiential accounts reveal that people with schizophrenia
experience themselves as changing in their journey toward healing. In the article, Roe (2001)
aptly concluded that the field has devoted much less attention to helping people reclaim their
personhood than to identifying the myriad social determinants of negative client outcomes.
Adding to the evidence base on the evolving sense of self, Roe (2005) studied qualitative
accounts of 43 individuals diagnosed with a serious mental illness (SMI) over one year to dually
explore the subjective impact of SMI on the self and the influence of the sense of self on SMI.
His findings revealed that over 75% of participants reported a diminished sense of self following
the experience of SMI, such as not feeling “’like my old self’” and having the experience of
psychosis unsettle “self and identity” (p. 37). Relatedly, 71% of participants also noted that the
loss of self negatively influenced their outlook on the future, with reservations about successfully
achieving personal goals. Additionally, participants described recovering from their illness
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through a redefinition of the self, which occurred through restoring old parts of oneself (i.e.,
hobby, activity, interpersonal relations) and experiencing themselves as more than their
diagnosis and its related associations. The core features that these scholars argue may have been
overlooked and that may tie together the various measured outcomes of recovery, is the
integration of these individual aspects into a broader sense of self.
Narrative and the self
As described, schizophrenia has long been noted to fundamentally disrupt the experience
of the self and relatedly, deficits in the ability to coherently and meaningfully narrate the course
and progression of one’s life (Lysaker, Wickett, Campbell, & Buck, 2003). This alteration in the
sense of self may manifest in difficulties to coherently narrate one’s life story as a protagonist
with agency who forges deep connections with other people (Lysaker, & Lysaker, 2001).
Scholars have argued that personal narrative as an entryway to the person’s sense of self should
be studied and understood in order provide a gestalt (beyond separate areas of functioning) of the
complexities, nuances, and definitions the person ascribes to their subjective understanding of
the self. Importantly, other researchers have written that narrative in schizophrenia becomes a
central vehicle that may allow people to take ownership over and ascribe meaning to their own
stories, which is something that becomes even more significant in light of the stigma and
discrimination experiences to which people with schizophrenia are subjected (Davidson, 2005;
Smorti, Risaliti, Pananti, & Cipriani, 2008). Researchers studying narrative formation in
schizophrenia contend that narrative ought to be explored in the context of recovery, because
having a narrative serves as springboard for understanding how people relate to others and
themselves, how they seek support, and how they perceive their ability to be an active agent in
their lives (Roe & Davidson, 2005).

20
Narrative identity is the story constructed about the self that gives the person’s life a
sense of meaning and coherence (Adler & Olin, 2012). Personal narratives give way to meaning
about the self, tie together parts of oneself, and offer a coherent story upon which a stable and
evolving identity can form. P.H. Lysaker, J.T. Lysaker and T. Lysaker (2001) characterized the
self in schizophrenia as a breakdown of the dialogical self, which refers to the process by which
people hold internal dialogues within the self (e.g., negotiating between contradictory self
positions). This also involves maintaining a self-dialogue across these shifting positions such that
there is a synthesis of the various aspects of the self, contributing to the overall sense of self. In
schizophrenia, Lysaker et al. (2001) argued that the sense of self, as illustrated in narrative form,
is fundamentally disrupted, resulting in cacophonous or monological narratives. Cacophonous
narratives shift quickly from various parts of the self (e.g., as a sinner, as reliant, as a solider)
without true integration “to any central self” (Lysaker et al., 2001, p. 257). In contrast,
monological narratives remain fixed on a particular part of the self that dictates the rest of the
self positions (e.g., self as persecuted in all contexts). Furthermore, researchers have suggested
that the use of personal narrative may offer a richer and more expansive way for individuals to
understand their relationship to their illness, particularly related to insight (Roe & Kravetz,
2003). As theorists have pointed out, narrative enables individuals to provide a storied account of
their sense of selves in context and in doing so, this form of “self” examination opens up new
avenues to study the self in relation to other aspects of schizophrenia.
Despite the proliferation of writing about the self, schizophrenia, and the narrative
process, most studies lacked a quantitative scale of narrative quality. As such, researchers
developed a scale to quantitatively examine sense of self through narrative development among
people with schizophrenia (Lysaker & Buck, 2006; Lysaker, Buck, Hammoud, Taylor, & Roe,
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2006). The Scale to Assess Narrative Development (STAND) is a quantitative tool to evaluate
narrative transformation in individuals with schizophrenia. Derived from individual
psychotherapy transcripts (Lysaker & Davis, 2007) and leading theoretical perspectives (Bruner,
2002; Lysaker et al., 2001; Sass & Parnas, 2003), the STAND contains four subscales that tap
into the aspects of narration seen as central to the healthy development of the self. The first
subscale, social worth, measures the degree to which a person believes s/he has value to
important others (e.g., worth as a family member, friend, employee). The second subscale,
personal agency, refers to the person’s belief about their ability to actively impact events
occurring in their lives. The third subscale, illness conception, assesses the extent to which a
person can clearly and coherently articulate specific elements of their mental disorder (e.g.,
hallucinations result from genetic and environmental factors). The fourth subscale, alienation,
examines the degree to which a person feels interpersonally connected and close with other
people in their social world (e.g., discussing personal and sensitive matters with a friend).
Although these scales do show small to moderate intercorrelations, they do represent distinct
constructs that are thought to capture dimensions of the self that show the potential to change in
therapeutic settings. Indeed, a comparison of STAND ratings between people with schizophrenia
and other disabled groups (legal blindness and depression) revealed that the participants with
schizophrenia told stories with significantly less self-worth and agency (Lysaker et al., 2005).
Factors influencing the self
Self-stigma. Stigma refers to the linking of negative stereotypes (widely regarded beliefs
about a group) to a label denoting membership in a marginalized group, such as people with
mental illness (Link & Phelan, 2001). It is thought that stigma unfolds when labelling (noting
differences), stereotyping (attribution of negative qualities to group) and separating (us versus
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them) occur which result in status loss and discrimination for the “othered” individual. Common
negative stereotypes about mental illness include beliefs of dangerousness, unpredictability,
inability to recover, lack of intelligence, and weakness. Stigmatizing attitudes may also lead to
exclusionary behaviors including overt discrimination (e.g., in housing or employment) and
social rejection behaviors (Patrick W Corrigan, Markowitz, & Watson, 2004). As a result of the
messages communicated to the public about mental illness, individuals diagnosed with mental
illness are vulnerable to feeling excluded and devalued in the community (Livingston & Boyd,
2010). One reaction to public stigma is called self-stigma which occurs when people begin to
internalize the hurtful stereotypes about mental illness. More specifically, self-stigma refers to
the process by which individuals diagnosed with a mental illness begin to accept and apply the
negative stereotypes about mental illnesses to themselves (Patrick W Corrigan & Watson, 2002).
One study found that 36% of people with severe mental illness endorsed elevated self-stigma
(West, Yanos, Smith, Roe, & Lysaker, 2011) and another study reported that 42% of their
sample of people diagnosed with schizophrenia reported elevated self-stigma (Brohan, Elgie,
Sartorius, & Thornicroft, 2010). As described by Watson, Corrigan, Larson, and Sells (2007), a
three-step process must occur for self-stigma to unfold: (1) awareness of the public stereotypes;
(2) agreement with the stereotypes and (3) application of stereotypes to oneself as a result of
group membership. Of importance, researchers have stated that self-stigma can adversely alter
the person’s sense of self, from being a person with valued identities and roles (i.e., friend,
brother), to a person with discredited, stigmatized identities (e.g., mental patient; Yanos, Roe,
Markus, & Lysaker, 2008). In what Yanos, Roe, and Lysaker (2010) termed “illness identity,”
the experience of the objective components of a mental illness (e.g., symptoms) as well as the
way the person ascribes meaning to said illness, determines the type of “illness identity” that the
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person embraces (i.e., empowered, stigmatized, none). Thus, the widespread prevalence of
mental illness stigma warrants attention because attitudes about mental illness in the public may
impact the way a person makes sense of their mental illness or their “illness identity.” For
instance, if a person interprets the experience of having a mental illness to indicate that s/he is
weak and incompetent, then the person’s illness narrative can “infect” their overall sense of self
or identity (Yanos, Roe, & Lysaker, 2010, p. 77). Hence, it is not surprising that an abundance of
research finds that self-stigma leads to decrements in self experiences including self-esteem, selfefficacy, and personal narrative (Corrigan & Watson, 2002; Livingston & Boyd, 2010; Watson et
al., 2007). Taken further, it has now been recognized that self-stigma acts as a significant barrier
to achieving mental health recovery goals more broadly, even in the presence of effective and
client-centered service delivery (Patrick W. Corrigan & Rao, 2012). The diminished goal
achievement that results from elevated self-stigma which lowers self-esteem and self-efficacy
has been coined the “why try” effect to explain the pathway of how self-stigma may damage
self-esteem and self-efficacy which then impedes goal setting and attainment (Corrigan, Larson,
& Rüsch, 2009).
A considerable body of evidence has shown that self-stigma is linked to domains such as
quality of life, the experience of the self, symptom severity, self-esteem, self-efficacy, social
support, and empowerment (Vauth, Kleim, Wirtz, & Corrigan, 2007; Watson et al., 2007;
Yanos et al., 2008). In a meta-analysis of 127 studies investigating associations of self-stigma,
subjective experiences like hope, self-esteem, empowerment, and self-efficacy were strongly
negatively correlated with self-stigma (r = -.54 to -.58; Livingston & Boyd, 2010). Moreover,
based on data collected from 1085 participants with a schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis across
Europe, a multivariate regression model found that self-esteem/self-efficacy,
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power/powerlessness, perceived discrimination, social contacts, and personal agreement with
mental health diagnosis predicted 50% of the score variation in self-stigma (Brohan et al., 2010).
Notably, elements of empowerment (power/powerlessness and self-esteem/efficacy) carried
robust univariate correlations with self-stigma, such that higher levels of self-stigma were related
to lower levels of empowerment (r = -.64, p<.001). The robust research conducted with selfstigma and self-reported recovery demonstrates the impact of negative societal messages (i.e.,
stigma) on aspects of the self experience.
In a cross-sectional study of 172 outpatients diagnosed with schizophrenia, Vauth, Kleim,
Wirtz, and Corrigan (2007) examined the impact of self-stigma and coping with stigma on
outcomes of self-concept including self-efficacy and empowerment. Their structural equational
analyses supported a model demonstrating that coping strategies (secrecy and withdrawal)
accounted for 35% of variance in self-stigma, self-stigma explained 21% of the variance in selfefficacy, self-efficacy accounted for 51% of the variance in empowerment and empowerment
accounted for 46% and 58% of the variance in depression and quality of life, respectively. The
authors suggested that withdrawal and secrecy as forms of coping may represent an avoidance
strategy that fuels anticipatory anxiety and fear of future stigmatizing (as evidenced by the
association between coping and self-stigma). Other researchers have extended the research to test
mediation models to examine the interrelationships between multiple variables. Based on a
sample of 179 individuals with severe mental illness, Mashiach-Eizenberg, Hasson-Ohayon,
Yanos, Lysaker, and Roe (2013) demonstrated that self-esteem fully mediated the relationship
between self-stigma and hope, and hope partially mediated the relationship between self-esteem
and quality of life. In other words, high levels of self-stigma negatively impacted self-esteem
which led to increased feelings of hopelessness.
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Although many variables have shown relationships to self-stigma, researchers
acknowledge that longitudinal research studying these phenomena over time remains limited. By
studying these variables longitudinally, the field will contribute to the understanding of the way
in which these variables unfold and interact with one another over time.
Research suggests that prevailing societal beliefs about mental illness and individual
deficits affiliated with the illness, like thinking complexly about oneself and others, dually
impact the experience of the self in schizophrenia. Lysaker and Buck (2008) published findings
from a sample of 51 outpatients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (five women) that
explored the contribution of metacognition and self-stigma to the self-experience. The stereotype
endorsement subscale of the internalized stigma of mental illness scale (degree of agreement
with and application of negative stereotypes to oneself, ISMIS; Ritsher, Otilingam, & Grajales,
2003) was significantly negatively associated with STAND total scores, such that as rates of
stereotype endorsement increased, people showed diminished experiences of the self as assessed
by the STAND (r = -.38). In particular, the relationship of stereotype endorsement to one of the
four STAND’s subscale, social worth, appeared to drive the significant relationship.
Conceptually, if mental illness stereotypes are believed and applied to oneself (e.g., dangerous,
lacking intelligence, unpredictable), it is easy to imagine that one would perceive themselves to
be of little worth or value to one’s community. Other subscales of the ISMIS that were
hypothesized to show associations with the STAND, discrimination experience and alienation,
did not significantly relate to STAND scores and study authors believe that the lack of variance
may have contributed to these null findings. Additionally, metacognition (as measured by the
Metacognition Assessment Scale) was robustly associated to the experience of the self; as
metacognitive capacity improved, narrative development also increased (r =.59). After
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statistically controlling for level of education, social desirability, and illness awareness, higher
MAS total scores (16%) and less stereotyped self-stigma endorsement (11%) predicted higher
STAND total scores. Put another way, participants with reduced metacognitive capacity and the
endorsement of negative stereotypes about mental illness recounted diminished self-narratives.
Authors posit that the unique combination of a reduced ability to think about oneself and the
agreement with mental illness stereotypes of incompetency, danger, and lack of intelligence may
resemble a state that Bleuler identified understanding one’s “'own person as the external
world...in a completely unclear manner so that the patient hardly knows how to orient himself
either inwardly or outwardly.’"(Lysaker & Buck, 2008)
Self-stigma remains integral to the study of the self in schizophrenia as it will help
unpack the social contexts that may drive internal processes such as identity. These studies
contribute to the knowledge base by demonstrating mediation models and interrelationships, yet
longitudinal designs may be able to confirm and replicate some of these findings with more
robust designs.
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Chapter 4: Self and Coping
Broadly, coping refers to “cognitive and behavioral efforts to master, reduce, or tolerate
the internal and/or external demands that are created by the stressful transaction” (Folkman,
1984, p. 843). Coping enables people to utilize strategies to protect themselves from adverse
experiences which may occur through changing their behavior, modifying the meaning of the
experience, or tolerating the emotions associated with the stressful event (Pearlin & Schooler,
1978). Traditionally, coping has been characterized by the way that people respond to stressful
events, yet more recent conceptualizations cast a wider net by extending coping to a breadth of
responses (i.e., situations without an imminent stressor). This section will briefly examine the
models of coping tailored to individuals with schizophrenia as well as some of the research
linking coping responses to aspects of the self.
People with schizophrenia are confronted with significant stressors that include not only
distressing psychiatric symptoms but also include social stressors linked to poverty, stigma,
discrimination, an increased risk for violence and homelessness, and regular day to day stressors
(Roe, Yanos, & Lysaker, 2006; Yanos et al., 2006). Moreover, research has revealed that people
with schizophrenia face challenges with not only coping skills but also the scope of coping (e.g.,
limited to reacting and avoidance; Mueser et al., 1997; Roe et al., 2006, Wiedl, & Schöttner,
1991). Earlier frameworks of coping in schizophrenia identified two recovery styles –integration
and sealing over-- that offered a way to understand how people with schizophrenia coped with
their illness (McGlashan, 1987; McGlashan, Levy, & Carpenter, 1975). A person who adopts the
first recovery style, integration, attempts to develop “continuity in their mental activity and
personality from before the psychotic experience, during psychosis, and through recovery”
(McGlashan, 1987, p. 681). An integrative style allows the person to take a curious and flexible
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stance toward their psychosis such that s/he has the opportunity to use their experiences as a way
to get to know oneself better. In contrast, a person who uses a sealing over style will distance the
psychosis by keeping it isolated from the person’s experience. The person does not seek to
understand the psychotic experience and opts to keep the experience compartmentalized from the
rest of their life experience. More recently, some scholars have noted that McGglashan’s
classifications reflect levels of awareness or illness insight as opposed to overall coping style,
given that his description focused mainly on symptoms (Yanos & Moose, 2007).
The field of coping is vast and some researchers have written about specific coping
frameworks that are relevant to people with psychosis. Roe, Yanos, and Lysaker (2006) applied
Schwarzer’s proactive coping theory to psychosis for several reasons. First, the model was
comprised of four types of coping related to the temporal nature of the stressor (i.e., occurring in
past, immediate, future), which overlapped well with the varying stressors faced by individuals
with psychosis (e.g. bothersome symptoms, relapse prevention, goal setting). The theory’s
emphasis on the person’s appraisal of both the source of stress and the self is consistent with the
researchers’ assertions that a person copes with experiences through assessing the stressor itself
and the person’s belief in their ability to tolerate the experience. The first type of coping,
reactive coping, occurs in an effort to handle current or past stressful situations with two
subtypes of coping, emotion-focused and problem-focused. The authors described an emotionfocused coping response as reacting to and dealing with an emotion related to a primary
symptom (e.g., voices). Alternatively, problem-focused coping would be an attempt to cope with
the voices directly. Further, the authors noted that reactive coping can take many forms,
involving approach and avoidance coping strategies, which may vary in their effectiveness
depending on the nature of the stressor. Similarly, the authors argued that the coping response
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may be transactional such that a coping strategy in one encounter may be adaptive but the same
strategy in another situation may be less effective. Next, anticipatory coping occurs in
preparation for something that could happen in the future, like a psychiatric relapse. That is, this
type of coping relies on planning for an event that is likely to occur at some point in the future
(i.e., relapse prevention plan). Preventive coping is the type of coping a person deploys for
events occurring in the far future. In contrast to anticipatory coping, as the name implies,
preventive coping aims to both “prevent” the person from experiencing stressful events and to
enhance one’s ability to handle stress by building an arsenal of coping strategies (e.g., wellnessmanagement skills). In a study by Yanos (2001), participants diagnosed with a severe mental
illness reported the common use of strategies such as receiving social support, attending
professional services, using medication, exercising, and maintaining hygiene. Recently, Yanos
and Rosario (2014) found that in a group of 27 individuals with serious mental illnesses who
were interviewed for up to 20 days regarding their daily coping and end-of-day mood, specific
categories of preventive coping were reported often, with 82% of the sample indicating the use
of social support and 78% reporting engaging in activities/hobbies. Lastly, proactive coping,
describes a form of coping that “include efforts to actively strive, seek new challenges, create
new opportunities, and negotiate appraisals so that they will be less negative.” (p. 7). This
framework for coping as applied to people with schizophrenia can serve as a structure for
understanding how the experience of the self fits into coping strategies.
Roe and his colleagues (2006) proposed that how a person perceives him/herself “in
relation” to the situation remains as important as perceiving the situation (i.e., appraisal of
event). They proposed that the self experience may account for choices in coping strategies. That
is, the way one appraises the self impacts the manner in which the person appraises and copes
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with the stressful situation. The authors also highlighted that the experience of the self has a
significant bearing on the interaction between the person and event. They described that “it
includes a cognitive perception and emotional experience of a balance between life and self in
which the unmanageable no longer negates the person as an actor/observer” (Roe et al. 2006).
Put differently, the self remains a sturdy and active agent in the face of events, impacting the
extent to which the self perceives the event as overwhelming or manageable. In support of this
thesis, research has found that people with psychosis perceive less control and rate their coping
strategies as less effective than comparison groups (Berry, Barrowclough, Byrne, & Purandare,
2006; Horan, Ventura, Nuechterlein, Subotnik, Hwang, & Mintz, 2005) which is consistent with
the literature documenting the presence of a shaky self in schizophrenia. The notion of studying
the self in relation to coping can provide insights and connections regarding whether the
experience of oneself contributes to the coping response employed.
In a comprehensive review of 85 published papers on coping and psychosis, Phillips,
Francey, Edwards, and McMurray (2009) examined coping responses to general life stressors
and coping strategies for psychotic symptoms. Their review suggests that various models and
methods have been employed to examine coping, making it difficult to draw any sound
conclusions. To that end, Phillips and colleagues (2009) noted the heterogeneity of coping
strategies used and that many factors appear to contribute to selection of coping strategies along
with its utility. Their conclusions indicated that more pointed and focused research remains
warranted, particularly research that goes beyond cataloging coping strategies and aims to
explore the influence of other factors (like appraisal) on the use and selection of coping
responses.
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In summary, despite a great deal of research conducted on coping and stress, less research
has directly investigated the interface between the experience of the self and coping response. In
particular, narrative measures of the self are well-suited to find meaningful relationships to
coping in schizophrenia. In other words, the self experience may clarify to help researchers
understand the reasons why individuals opt to employ certain coping strategies over others.
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Chapter 5: Personal Narrative and Outcomes of Recovery
Qualitative and quantitative research on narrative forms of treatment and assessment in
schizophrenia have deepened the field’s understanding of the influence of narrative on the
recovery process. This section describes research evaluating narrative changes across
interventions like individual psychotherapy and supported employment along with recovery
correlates associated with dimensions of personal narrative.
Researchers have published accounts of individual case studies exploring the person’s
evolving narrative over the course of treatment. Through three family therapy cases of
individuals with early psychosis, Holma and Aaltonen (1997) studied the transformation and
search for narrative across the therapy process. Notable themes emerging from these cases
included the fusion of inner and outer worlds, the emerging agency from an observer to an active
participant, and the agency that is preserved via retreat into psychosis. Moreover, the authors
purported that psychosis may help the person maintain some agency at the expense of losing
her/his social connections, resulting in increased social withdrawal and alienation. They viewed
“narrative construction to experience” as one of the main purposes of therapy to allow the person
to flexibly explore and construct personal stories of their own lives (Holma & Aalotnen, 1997, p.
476). In 2005, through a single case study method, other clinical researchers aimed to identify
changes in narrative structure and content over a 32 month period of psychotherapy (Lysaker, et
al., 2005). The individual’s psychotherapy transcripts were blindly rated for narrative content,
structure and metacognition two times monthly with the use of validated, standardized measures.
All measured domains demonstrated improvements at the end of the study period (32 months).
The authors discovered that narrative structure, or the ability to tell one’s story with sufficient
detail in temporal order, started to improve prior to gains in narrative content and metacognition.
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Within the STAND subscales, the client’s agency began to improve more rapidly than his
awareness of illness, which may indicate that the client had to gain enough agency before
becoming aware of his illness, which may bring on feelings of helplessness due to stigma. As
these changes related to symptoms, structural narrative enhancements appeared to coincide with
reductions in positive symptoms and narrative content and metacognition paralleled changes in
negative symptoms. The authors noted that this pattern matches previously observed associations
between narrative structure and positive symptoms and narrative content and metacognition with
negative symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2005).
Smorti, Risaliti, Pananti, and Cipriani (2008) conducted a longitudinal study exploring
the autobiographical process in a group of 15 psychiatric inpatients. In line with Holma and
Aalotnen (1997), the authors explained that the telling of personal narratives allows the
individual to communicate their story to another person and also, to “transform memories” by
ascribing different meaning to them in a psychotherapeutic process (Smorti et al., 2008, p. 532).
To shed light on the narrative process, the research members conducted a loosely structured
autobiographical-narrative interview at two time points (baseline and two weeks following),
containing broad probes that touched on early development, family, friends, education,
employment, illnesses, and previous methods of coping. Through the use of a coding system that
captured narrative information and narrative organization, the authors compared the narrative
productions from the first interview to the second interview. The researchers found statistically
significant increases in the portrayal of an active self, of the self as narrator, of self-attributes and
self-evaluation, and of logical connectedness in the narrative organization. Thus, the authors
suggested that the very production of an autobiographical narrative may induce changes in the
content and form of the narrative, which may consequently affect the fundamental experience of
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the self. With the continued repetition of narratives, stories may begin to gain more clarity and
organization whereby people “assume different self-positions and enrich their autobiographical
accounts, in terms of psychological state and coherence,” especially when the story is shared
within a supportive and collaborative context (i.e., psychotherapy). These studies continue to
build evidence that the quantitative study of personal narratives is not only justified in
schizophrenia but is necessary as the field grows to expand our understanding of the self in
schizophrenia.
Over the last 15 years, a series of studies have been conducted to examine relationships
among the STAND with self-esteem, recovery readiness, hope, illness insight, psychiatric
symptoms, quality of life, neurocognition, metacognition, and self-stigma. These studies have
moved the field of self and narrative forward, from individual case studies and theoretical
accounts to statistical examinations of recovery related variables. In a sample of 30
schizophrenia spectrum clients (one female), Lysaker et al., 2006 found that readiness for change
and self-esteem accounted for 17% and 10% of the variance in STAND total scores respectively.
Interestingly, self-esteem showed significant associations to STAND subscales of social worth
(rho =.40) and personal agency (rho = .35) while readiness to change significantly related to the
other two STAND subscales, illness conception (rho = .47) and alienation (rho = .41). In making
sense of these correlations, the authors speculated that enhanced levels of readiness (e.g., action)
may be influenced by both an acknowledgement that one has a problem amenable to change and
a belief in having personally meaningful connections whereas self-esteem may rely on one’s
value and agency in the community and for oneself.
In another study investigating quantitative evaluations of self-experience to other
objective and subjective recovery measures, 65 individuals with schizophrenia spectrum
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disorders completed assessments of illness insight, quality of life, hope, and psychiatric
symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2006). With regard to symptom profiles (positive, negative, or
cognitive), ANOVA analyses determined that statistically significant differences emerged
between participants with significant versus non-significant positive, cognitive, and overall
symptom profiles, such that those classified with a significant symptom profile (i.e., were more
symptomatic) produced more impoverished narratives than those with less psychiatric
symptomatology. These findings are in contrast to Lysaker and his colleagues’ (2003) results
showing that only negative symptoms (and not positive symptoms or emotional discomfort)
showed statistically significant moderate correlations to all subscales of the STAND; however
the small sample size (n = 25) of participants with schizophrenia may have accounted for these
results. These various findings provide evidence for the interrelationships and connections
between objective and subjective measures of recovery (Resnick et al., 2004). For example, as
compared to persons without prominent positive symptoms, persons with positive symptoms
narrated stories where they minimally affected the direction of their lives. Those without
significant cognitive symptoms were evidenced to articulate their stories about their mental
health more effectively and showed more self-worth in the community. In a multiple regression
explaining the variance of STAND scores, quality of life ratings predicted 17% of the variance
and illness insight (SUMD) predicted 6% of variance, while hope showed no bearing on this
prediction. That is, higher quality of life ratings reflected richer narratives with a more complex
description of personal challenges and agency along with enhanced connectedness to others.
Overall, these findings suggest persons describing fuller experiences of the self seemed to show
greater psychosocial functioning and that narrative qualities do show meaningful relationships to
psychiatric symptoms.
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In another study, a total of 88 individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders
participated in a study to investigate whether more developed personal narratives would
positively predict the quantity and quality of social relationships (Lysaker, Ringer, Maxwell,
McGuire, & Lecomte, 2010). After entering psychiatric symptoms, hope, self-esteem, and
intelligence as covariates, the authors found small to moderate statistically significant
relationships between the quantity of social relationships (e.g., number of acquaintances) and
three of the four STAND subscales (social alienation r = .37; personal agency r = .21; social
worth r=.23). Similarly, small to moderate positive significant correlations were observed
between quality of social relationships and all four STAND subscales (social alienation r=.25;
personal agency r =.40; social worth r =.36; illness conception r =.21). Negative symptoms,
social alienation, and positive symptoms emerged as significant predictors of the frequency of
social contact, explaining 30% of the total variance (14%, 10%, 6% respectively). Similarly, four
variables – negative symptoms, personal agency, verbal ability, and social worth – accounted for
almost half of the variance in the prediction of the qualitative components of social relationships
(e.g., being able to discuss personal matters; 29%, 11%, 3%, 2% respectively). This study reveals
that personal narratives show important and unique connections to social relationships so much
so that the authors wondered whether the production of a rich narrative can facilitate social
connections. Questions regarding whether narrative components like connectedness to others or
enhanced personal agency contribute to seeking social interactions remains open for empirical
investigation with prospective research designs.
Few studies have looked at narrative changes in prospective research designs. In an effort
to study the way individual psychotherapy affects narrative identity, Adler (2012) explored the
prospective changes in narrative development through the collection of written narratives across
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12 therapy sessions. That is, following each therapy session, forty-seven outpatients presenting
with a range of problems (e.g., divorce, adjustment, and depression) were asked to write about
“how you feel your therapy is affecting you this week.” (Adler, 2012, p. 373). Two main
findings of the analysis revealed that (1) agency but not narrative coherence increased with the
passage of time and (2) improvements in agency preceded increases in mental health, as
measured by the Systemic Therapy Inventory of Change. This association remained significant
after adjusting for individual variations such as personality traits and ego development. Adler
explained this result through self-determination theory, which suggests that people seek to
master personal difficulties occurring in their worlds and doing so is inherently an act of agency.
Reductions in mental health symptoms will follow as one begins to perceive a greater capacity to
manage life challenges.
A nine month long study conducted by Bourdeau, Lecomte, & Lysaker (2015) to identify
and assess the correlates of two recovery stages (moratorium defined by avoidance,
hopelessness, confusion and awareness defined by the possibility of the self as able to recover,
in Andresen et al., 2006) in a group of 47 individuals with first episode psychosis revealed that
following improved social engagement, as measured by the Birchwood Social Functioning Scale,
improved narrative development was the second best predictor of membership in the awareness
recovery stage. These results highlight the importance of an improved personal narrative as a
discriminator between two recovery stages.
The only study found examining narrative development longitudinally in people with
severe mental illness evaluated the progression of personal narrative in a supported employment
program. In a prospective eight-month longitudinal study, Cartwright (2014) examined the
extent to which subjective self-experience, as measured by personal narrative, predicted work
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outcomes in a group of 38 participants with serious mental illness (23 of 38 participants
diagnosed with schizophrenia) enrolled in supported employment (SE). In contrast to the
author’s study hypotheses, narrative quality was significantly more impoverished (as measured
by the STAND) in the group of clients who attained employment compared to those who failed
to find work. Compared to unemployed clients (42.1%), clients employed at 8 months (57.9%)
produced baseline narratives with significantly more social alienation and reduced social worth.
Further, after adjusting for variables known to impact work functioning (negative symptoms,
executive functioning, self-esteem), lack of connectedness to others at baseline explained 35.5%
of the variance in hours worked weekly at eight months; in other words, clients who perceived
increased closeness to others were less likely to work more hours. Over time, narratives told by
the unemployed clients showed statistically significant improvements in personal agency (i.e.,
being able to affect events in one’s own life) from baseline to two months, as shown with a
moderate to large effect size (n^2 = .33, p = .01). The author proposed that perhaps the
experience of failing to find work strengthens personal agency by helping clients realize the
responsibility they have in their lives. Cartwright (2014) explained that the lack of concordance
between the self-experience and vocational outcomes may suggest that people who experience
more alienation may show greater motivation to succeed in work pursuits to find personal
fulfillment. Alternatively, it could be that those with more developed and complex narratives
may have had higher standards for the types of jobs they would accept and as a result, their rates
of employment were reduced compared to clients with more impoverished narratives. Though
the small sample size precludes the drawing of any firm conclusions, this study does suggest that
narrative may change in unexpected ways and future studies should aim to clarify how and what
factors are associated with this process.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
The studies reviewed above demonstrate the importance of studying the self through
narrative development in schizophrenia. Leading researchers, theorists, and consumers recognize
that, in comparison to an “I have” disorder, schizophrenia reflects an “I am” disorder – a disorder
that has the potential to fundamentally alter the person’s sense of self. Personal accounts, clinical
observations, and empirical research have reached a consensus that the self in schizophrenia
represents an important area of study in understanding processes of illness and recovery. Owing
to the recovery movement, the self in schizophrenia is now examined through the lens of
recovery, whereby the changes in the self-experience over the illness course are considered
essential to the person’s recovery. Studying the self through narrative within the context of
personal or subjective recovery has allowed researchers to consider how other aspects of
objective and subjective recovery fit into the experience of the self. Other researchers have
emphasized the deleterious impact of public stigma on the way individuals experience and think
about themselves (i.e., self as weak; self as incompetent). Further, researchers have also
proposed that coping responses may be also be informed by the way in which a person thinks
about themselves as a whole. Altogether, the current body of literature on the topic of the selfexperience in schizophrenia suggests that future explorations of the self could meaningfully
contribute to the field by replicating previous findings, generating new hypotheses about
processes of change in schizophrenia, and adding methodological rigor to the study designs.
The knowledge on the self in schizophrenia has grown over the last 20 years, particularly
with the addition of empirical research designs that have aimed to quantify the self through
personal narrative. Nonetheless, there are gaps in the literature on this topic that limit the
drawing of conclusions, particularly regarding whether and how the experience of the self
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impacts and is impacted by other dimensions of recovery over time. Currently, there is evidence
to suggest that the self experience, as measured through personal narrative, positively relates to
quality of life, self-esteem, metacognitive skills and negatively relates to the endorsement of
negative stereotypes, positive symptoms, and cognitive symptoms. These converging studies
reveal that the self-experience adds to the array of factors moving the field forward in
understanding factors that facilitate and hinder a person’s recovery. Yet, most of these reviewed
studies looked at these factors in cross-sectional designs, so future research with longitudinal
designs could shed more light on the predictive nature of the self on these variables. Moreover,
studies combining many of these key variables could benefit the literature by accounting for
theoretically relevant variables in one study, which could aid in examining the overall model.
There is one published study focusing on the self-experience through personal narrative over
eight months (Cartwright, 2014); however, this study included participants with schizophrenia
and mood disorders and it may have overlooked important variables, like hope and self-stigma,
that may have moderated and clarified the relationship between personal narrative and
competitive employment. Relatedly, few studies have examined how the self-experience relates
to domains of vocational and educational functioning; exploring these connections could offer
more clues about the concordance of objective and subjective recovery. Additionally, in the
investigations examining the self-experience, study participants tended to be male, which
significantly restricts the conclusions drawn for females with schizophrenia spectrum disorders,
and it remains a question for future research to examine whether the same relationships hold for
females. More specifically, with the exception of one study where 29% of the entire sample was
female (n = 11), the other studies included a minority of women, ranging from two to fourteen
percent of the entire sample (Lysaker et al., 2006).
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Overall, the field would benefit from prospective research designs with diverse samples
that explore the extent to which the self-experience predicts changes in indicators of objective
and subjective recovery. Thus, the temporal sequence of whether these elements change
simultaneously or whether change in one variable precedes changes in other variables remains to
be tested. Longitudinal research will more precisely explore these relationships over time and
will shed light on their interactions (Roe et al., 2011). Being able to understand which changes
occur when will support researchers’ efforts to identify mechanisms that may produce
therapeutic change and relatedly, it will direct clinicians’ efforts in targeting particular domains
in a graded fashion.
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Chapter 7: The Current Study
This study aims to investigate the influences of the self-experience on recovery-related
factors (both subjective and objective) among people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and
elevated self-stigma. The objectives in this study are threefold: (1) to study the associations
between the self-experience and others facets of recovery among people with schizophreniaspectrum disorders in a prospective design; (2) to examine the predictive relationship of the selfexperience to subjective and objective recovery indicators and (3) to extend prior results in this
area to more diverse samples. More specifically, one major goal of this project is to understand
how these recovery-related variables change and interact with each other in a prospective design
at two assessment points. The evaluation of the relationship between the self and other recovery
outcomes becomes essential in understanding how changes occur over time, with direct
implications for treatment. That is, this study extended the current literature by expanding on the
cross-sectional designs evaluating whether and how relationships between self-experience and
other recovery outcomes hold in a prospective design. Currently, the extent to which the selfexperience in a group of people with elevated levels of self-stigma bears on subjective and
objective recovery outcomes remains unknown. Likewise, no published research has explored
whether changes in the self-experience correspond to changes in other recovery domains.
Moreover, given that a majority of the research examining personal narrative in schizophrenia
has occurred with mainly male and white participants, this project aims to extend some of the
current findings regarding personal narrative in schizophrenia to more diverse samples that
include larger numbers of women and people of color. In sum, achieving these objectives would
add merit to this body of literature by answering important questions about the recovery process
for individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders.
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Hypotheses
H1: Participants will show improvements in personal narrative scores, as measured by the Scale
to Assess Narrative Development (STAND) from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (follow-up at five
months after the baseline assessment).
H2: Baseline self-stigma will be related to self-esteem at follow-up, and baseline self-experience
will partially mediate this relationship, such that a personal narrative demonstrating higher levels
of personal agency, social worth, illness conception and reduced levels of alienation will
partially account for the relationship between self-stigma and self-esteem.
H3: Adjusting for covariates, baseline personal narrative performance will predict the use of
problem-centered coping at follow-up, such that fuller and more developed personal narratives
will show a positive relationship to problem-centered coping. More specifically, three of the four
subscales on the STAND - alienation, agency and illness conception – are predicted to show
statistically significant relationships with problem-centered coping.
H3a: Adjusting for covariates, baseline personal narrative performance will predict the use of
avoidant-centered coping at follow-up, such that fuller and more developed personal narratives
will show an inverse relationship to avoidant coping. More specifically, two of the four subscales
on the STAND – alienation and agency – are predicted to show statistically significant
relationships with avoidant coping, such that decreased alienation and increased agency will
predict increased use of avoidant coping strategies.
H3b: No specific hypothesis is predicted for the relationship between personal narrative and
neutral coping strategies.
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H3c: As participants’ narratives improve over time (baseline to follow-up), participants’ reported
use of avoidant coping strategies will decrease and problem-centered and neutral coping
strategies will increase.
H4: Adjusting for covariates, more developed personal narrative at baseline will predict lower
levels of hopelessness at follow-up.
H5: Changes in personal narratives will positively correlate with changes in hopelessness.
H6: Adjusting for covariates, personal narrative at baseline will demonstrate a statistically
significant positive relationship with interpersonal and vocational functioning ratings at followup.
H6a: Improvements in personal narrative will correspond to gains in interpersonal and
vocational functioning.
H6b: Baseline levels of self stigma will be related to vocational functioning at follow-up, and
self-experience at baseline will mediate this relationship, such that personal narratives
demonstrating higher levels of personal agency, social worth, illness conception and reduced
levels of alienation will partially account for the relationship between self-stigma and vocational
functioning.
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Chapter 8: Methods
Data from this study was drawn from an ongoing randomized controlled trial comparing
a 20 week group-based treatment for self-stigma, Narrative Enhancement and Cognitive Therapy
(NECT; Yanos, Roe, & Lysaker, 2011), to supportive group therapy (Spaulding, 1989).
Participants were recruited from two partial hospitalization programs and one outpatient clinic at
Rutgers University Behavioral Health Care (RUBHC) in Newark and Piscataway, NJ and one
partial hospital and outpatient program affiliated with the Neuroscience Clinical Research Center
in Indianapolis, Indiana. Study participants completed clinical assessments at four time points-baseline, post-treatment, three-month follow-up and six-month follow-up, however the present
study included participants with assessments at baseline and post-treatment assessments.
Participants. Inclusion criteria for participants in the larger study are: (1) a Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition confirmed schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder
diagnosis; (2) at least 21 years old; (3) evidence of moderate or elevated self-stigma; (4)
speaking enough English to complete study assessments and engage in groups; (5) no evidence
of a current substance dependence disorder; (6) able to provide informed consent. This study
restricted the sample to participants who participated in the baseline and post-treatment followup interviews, as this project aims to evaluate data from baseline to post-treatment follow-up.
Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbons, &
First, 1994). The SCID-IV is a semi-structured interview that is commonly used in research
projects to determine psychiatric and substance use diagnoses. In this project, only the mood,
psychotic, and substance use disorders modules were administered to determine whether
participants met the diagnostic criteria for the study. At baseline, participants with a SCID-IV
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confirmed schizophrenia diagnosis or schizoaffective disorder diagnosis with no current
substance dependence are included in the project.
Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Scale (ISMIS; Boyd Ritsher, Otilingam, &
Grajales, 2003). The ISMIS is a 29-item self report measure assesses impact of internalized
stigma. Participants are asked to rate their level of agreement on a 4-point scale ranging from 0
(strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree), such that higher scores reflect higher levels of
internalized stigma. The items are anchored in the present and do not include specific
relationships or past incidents of experienced discrimination. The ISMIS yields five subscales,
which include alienation, stereotype endorsement, discrimination experience, social withdrawal,
and stigma resistance. Following reliability analyses, it was determined that the stigma resistance
subscale reduced the scale’s overall internal consistency and the subscale was removed from
further convergent and divergent validity analyses. Alienation, thought to lie at the core of the
self-stigma experience, captures the extent to which individuals perceive themselves as having a
‘spoiled identity.’ Sample items include “Having a mental illness has spoiled my life” and “I feel
inferior to others who don’t have a mental illness.” Stereotype endorsement reflects the rate of
self-agreement with common stereotypes about mental illness. Sample items include “I can’t
contribute anything to society because I have a mental illness” and “Mentally ill people tend to
be violent.” Discrimination experience refers to person’s subjective experience of being
discriminated against. A sample item includes, “People ignore me or take me less seriously just
because I have a mental illness.” Social withdrawal refers to the degree to which someone
withdraws from forging social interactions due to their mental illness. Sample items include “I
don’t socialize as much as I used to because my mental illness might make me look or behave
‘weird.’” In a sample of 127 individuals with severe mental illness, the ISMIS demonstrated
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predicted relationships with constructs of depression (r = .53), mental illness stigma (r = .35),
self-esteem (r = -.59), empowerment (r = -.52), and recovery orientation (r = -.49). Further,
reliability analyses indicated excellent internal consistency (alpha = .90) and test-retest reliability
(.92). In this study, participants are eligible if there is evidence of elevated self-stigma, as
defined by a mean score of at least one (0-3 scale) on the measure. In this study, reliability
analyses also found good to excellent internal consistency (Time 1 alpha = .88 and Time 2 alpha
= .93).
Coping with Symptoms Checklist (CSC; Yanos, Knight, & Bremer, 2003). The CSC
assesses the use of coping strategies across five symptom areas including anxiety, depression,
delusions, hallucinations, and mania. The participant is first asked if they have experienced
symptoms in the given area, and, if so, to indicate the frequency in which each coping strategy
has been used to manage the symptom in the past 12 months. Choices include “not at all,” “once
or twice,” “sometimes,” and “often.” Each symptom area contains coping items specifically
related to that domain, following the framework that the utility of coping strategies changes
based on targeted problem. For example, the authors observed that withdrawal from stimulation
for symptoms of mania may be fundamentally different (and more effective) than withdrawal to
deal with symptoms of depression, which would be considered an avoidance strategy. Each
domain contains coping strategies classified as problem-centered, avoidant, or neutral. Problemcentered coping includes cognitive and behavioral responses to problems, social support, and
medication adherence and “’active’ distraction efforts such as meditative refocusing” (p. 170).
Neutral coping responses include acceptance techniques, consumption of non-addictive
substances (e.g., decaffeinated tea), and attempts at distraction. Avoidant coping responses
include cognitive and behavioral attempts at avoidance (e.g. avoid talking about it), use of
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addictive substances, emotional outburst, social isolation, and an attitude of resignation.
Examples of strategies include “Do breathing or relaxation exercises” (problem-centered,
anxiety), “think of a fantasy to forget about it” (avoidant, delusional beliefs), “refocus my
attention onto an object or mediate to make the voices/sounds go away” (problem-centered,
hallucinations), and “do something to distract myself from it” (neutral, mania). Alpha
coefficients for each coping subscale across all symptom domains revealed adequate to good
internal consistency estimates -(problem-centered alpha > .80 ; neutral alpha = .67-.79; avoidant
alpha = .67-.87). The initial validation study showed anticipated relationships to self-confidence,
social functioning, and another measure of coping and no significant associations to unrelated
constructs (social desirability and insight). In this study, alpha coefficients were computed for
each symptom category, with good reliability estimates for problem-centered coping (Time 1
alpha = .89 and Time 2 alpha = .86) and neutral coping (Time 1 alpha = .83 and Time 2 alpha =
.83). Time 1 avoidant coping was good (alpha = .87) and Time 2 avoidant coping remained
adequate (alpha = .69).
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES is a 10-item scale
designed to assess global self-esteem. Self-esteem refers to “the overall affective evaluation of
one’s worth, value, or importance” (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991, p. 115). Participants rate their
level of agreement with 10 statements on a 4-point Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree,
agree, strongly agree). Higher scores reflect higher levels of self-esteem. Sample items include
“I feel I do not have much to be proud of” and “I feel I am a person of worth, at least on an equal
basis with others.” Studies have yielded high reliability estimates with several groups of people,
including people with mental illness (alpha = .87- .90; Ritsher et al., 2003, Torrey, Mueser,
McHugo, & Drake, 2000). The scale also has demonstrated convergent and divergent validity
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with constructs such as self-efficacy and depression (Patrick William Corrigan, Watson, & Barr,
2006). For this study, internal consistency estimates fell in the acceptable range (Time 1 alpha =
.73, and Time 2 alpha = .75)
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). The BHS is
a 20-item self-report true/false measure that is designed to assess the degree of pessimistic
beliefs. Items are summed such that higher scores indicate greater levels of hopelessness. The
authors reported excellent internal consistency (alpha = .93), and suggest that the measure is
sensitive to change. Total scores are summed to create an average hopelessness score, with
higher scores reflecting higher levels of hopelessness. In addition, construct validity was
supported by the confirmation of several hypotheses linked to hopelessness in depressive and
non-depressive samples. Consistent with previous Cronbach’s alpha estimates, this study also
yielded excellent reliability scores (Time 1 alpha = .92 and Time 2 alpha = .93)
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987).
The PANSS is a 31-item clinician-rated semi-structured interview evaluating positive symptoms,
negative symptoms, and general psychopathology. This instrument is a widely used tool in
schizophrenia research to examine changes in psychiatric symptoms over time. Trained
interviewers ask participants a series of questions to rate the severity of each symptom item on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (absent) to 7 (extreme) based on symptoms experienced over
the previous two weeks, with higher scores reflecting more severe psychopathology. The positive
scale consists of items measuring delusions, grandiosity, hallucinations, and conceptual
disorganization. The negative scale consists of items measuring flat affect, problems with
abstractions, social and emotional withdrawal, rapport, and stereotyped thinking. The general
psychopathology scale is thought to measure illness severity related to collective non-specific
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psychiatric symptoms. A composite score is also calculated by subtracting the total negative
scale score from the total positive scale score to determine which syndrome (positive or
negative) is more prominent. The authors reported acceptable internal consistency estimates for
the positive symptom scale (α = .73), negative symptom scale (α = .87), and general
psychopathology scale (α = .79). Validation studies have supported the scale’s construct validity
and criterion-related validity through expected associations to other clinical and cognitive
variables.
The Heinrichs-Carpenter Quality of Life Scale (QLS; Heinrichs, Hanlon, & Carpenter,
1984). The QLS is a 21-item rated scale through a semi-structured interview designed to assess
functional impairment in schizophrenia, particularly those related to the “deficit symptoms” of
schizophrenia. Despite its name, there is wide agreement in the field that the QLS is a measure of
objective functioning rather than “quality of life,” which is a term that is usually used to refer to
subjective satisfaction with various life domains. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from 0 (severe quality of life impairment) to 6 (no impairment in quality of life), such
that higher scores indicate better quality of life. The scale yields four subscales including
intrapsychic foundations, interpersonal relations, instrumental function, and commonplace
objects and activities. The intrapsychic foundations subscale collects information that are thought
to build the foundation for optimal social and role functioning like the capacity for empathy,
curiosity, motivation, sense of purpose, idle time, rapport with interviewer, and the ability to
experience pleasure. The interpersonal relations subscale assesses the participant’s degree of
social activities, social initiative (active or passive) and the quality of relationships with family
members, friends, acquaintances, and romantic partners. The instrumental function subscale
measures the participant’s current functioning in society (i.e., work, caretaker), the participant’s
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functioning potential compared to his/her premorbid level, and his/her enjoyment with work
(when applicable). Lastly, the common objects and activities subscale aims to evaluate the extent
to which the participant engages with his/her community through gathering information about
the number of common belongings (e.g., watch, hair brush, library card, etc.) owned and the
number and type of activities in which the person participates (e.g., taking public transportation
alone, reading the newspaper). The authors reported high intraclass correlations ranging between
.91 and .97. The initial study also validated the proposed four factor model via factor analysis.
Multidimensional Scale of Independent Functioning (MSIF; Jaeger, Berns, & Czobor,
2003). The MSIF is a semi-structured interview of functioning designed to examine functioning
in the domains of work, education, and housing. Within each functioning domain, three
dimensions are measured to capture the multidimensional aspects of functioning: (1) role
responsibility; (2) presence and level of support, and (3) quality of performance. Interviewers
rate each area on a seven-point Likert type scale (1 = normal functioning to 7 = complete
disability). Each domain (work, education, residential) receives a global rating that combines all
of the subareas into one composite score. Similarly, a total score is derived for each aspect of
functioning (i.e., role performance, support, performance) across all three domains of
functioning. Higher scores reflect greater levels of disability. Inter-rater reliability was adequate
for each individual rating (ICC = .74 – 1.00) and was excellent for global ratings (ICC = .91 .95). A validation study also revealed convergent validity with other scales of adjustment and
divergent validity with theoretically non-related constructs (i.e., hobbies, recreational activities).
In light of the nature of the measure whereby multiple areas of functioning are examined
together, internal consistency estimates yielded fair to good values (alpha = .67 - .72). This study
only used the global work rating variable in data analyses.
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Scale to Assess Narrative Development (STAND; Lysaker et al., 2006). The STAND is
an instrument designed to evaluate components of the self-experience related to recovery. The
scale contains four separate but related components including Illness Awareness, Social
Alienation, Personal Agency and Social Worth. Each element is rated on a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (no evidence that participant exhibits quality) to 5 (participants shows evidence
of quality). Illness Awareness rates the degree to which the participant can coherently explain
their experience of mental illness. Social Alienation measures whether the participant has close
relationships. Personal Agency taps into whether the participant believes s/he can affect the
course of his/her life. Social Worth evaluates the participant’s perception of his/her value to
others and to society. In order to rate the STAND, personal narratives are collected through the
administration of the Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (Lysaker, Clements, PlascakHallberg, Knipscheer, & Wright, 2002). The IPII is a semi-structured interview asking
participants to narrate the stories of their lives, to discuss whether mental illness has impacted
important areas in their life (e.g., work, relationships), to talk about the amount of control they
exhibit over their mental illness (and vice versa), and to comment on the way their illness
“affects and is affected by others” (Lysaker & Buck, n.d., p.2). Lysaker, Wickett, Campbell, and
Buck (2003) reported acceptable internal consistency values (α=.85) derived from mean ratings
of 16 transcripts and good inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation = .87). Concurrent validity
analyses revealed anticipated associations with related measures of self-esteem and readiness for
change.
Procedure
At all research sites, trained research assistants recruited participants (regardless of chart
diagnosis) to complete the ISMIS and a short demographic questionnaire including age, gender,
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age at first hospitalization, number of previous hospitalizations, education, race/ethnicity, and
marital status. If participants received a score of at least one on the ISMIS, suggesting
moderate/elevated levels of self-stigma, they were invited to participate in the larger treatment
study. A research assistant briefly described the overall project and if participants indicated
interest, they arranged to meet with a researcher interviewer to complete informed consent and
the baseline interview. At the baseline interview, the interviewer first administered the SCID-IV
to determine diagnostic eligibility (schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and lack of current
substance dependence disorder). After confirming diagnostic criteria, the remaining scales were
administered and participants were randomly assigned to the treatment condition (NECT) or the
active comparison condition (supportive therapy). All participants received monetary
compensation regardless of diagnostic eligibility. Stratification based on self-stigma severity was
employed to ensure that roughly equivalent numbers of participants with moderately elevated
scores (1-1.5 on the ISMIS) and elevated scores (1.5-3 on the ISMIS) were equally represented
in the treatment and comparison conditions. Subsequent to the intervention phase, participants
were invited to complete follow-up assessments at post-treatment, three months following and
six months following. This study will only examine data collected at baseline and post-treatment
follow-up.
Data Analysis Plan
Before testing study hypotheses, analyses will examine the distribution of all variables
and bivariate correlations between baseline STAND scores and other study variables.
H1: A repeated measures t-test will be conducted to examine whether STAND mean scores
statistically significantly differ from Time 1 to Time 2. A between-subjects ANOVA will
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examine whether the hypothesized STAND changes vary by intervention group assignment
(NECT or supportive group therapy).
H2: Regression analyses will examine (1) the relationship of baseline self-stigma (predictor) to
follow-up self-esteem, controlling for baseline self-esteem (outcome); (2) the relationship of
baseline self-stigma (predictor) to baseline personal narrative (mediator); (3) personal narrative
(mediator) to self-esteem (outcome).
H3: A hierarchical regression analysis will be conducted to examine the impact of baseline
personal narrative as measured by the STAND (predictor variable) on problem-centered coping
at follow-up. The following baseline covariates will be entered: problem-centered coping
strategy score, PANSS ratings on positive, negative, and general psychopathology symptoms,
intervention group assignment (NECT or supportive therapy), self-stigma scores, and hope. The
outcome variable, problem-centered coping at follow-up, will be entered into the next step of the
regression model.
H3a: A hierarchical regression analysis will be conducted to examine the impact of baseline
personal narrative as measured by the STAND (predictor variable) on avoidant coping at follow
up (outcome variable). The following baseline covariates will be entered: avoidant coping
strategy score, PANSS ratings on positive, negative, and general psychopathology symptoms,
intervention group assignment (NECT or supportive therapy), self-stigma scores, and hope. The
outcome variable, avoidant coping at follow-up will be entered into the next step of the
regression model.
H3b: An exploratory regression analysis will be conducted to investigate the impact of baseline
personal narrative as measured by the STAND on neutral coping at follow-up.
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H3c: Residual change scores will be calculated for personal narratives and coping strategies.
Correlational analyses will evaluate the relationship between personal narrative residual change
scores and coping strategy residual change scores (avoidant, problem-centered, and neutral).
H4: Controlling for baseline levels of hopelessness, psychopathology (PANSS scores), selfstigma, intervention assignment and self-esteem, a regression analysis will determine the extent
to which baseline personal narrative (predictor) statistically significantly predicts degree of
hopelessness.
H5: Residual change scores will be computed and a correlational analysis will examine the
degree to which changes in personal narrative are associated with changes in hopelessness.
H6: Adjusting for baseline levels of interpersonal and vocational functioning, hopelessness, selfesteem, psychopathology, and intervention group assignment, a stepwise regression analysis will
explore the relationship between personal narrative and quality of life.
H6a: Residual change scores will be computed for personal narrative and interpersonal and
vocational functioning and a correlational analysis will be conducted to examine the magnitude
of the relationship.
H6b: Regression analyses will examine (1) the relationship of self-stigma (predictor) to
vocational functioning (outcome; MSIF); (2) the relationship of self-stigma (predictor) to
personal narrative (mediator); (3) personal narrative (mediator) to vocational functioning
(outcome); and (4) self-stigma and personal narrative relationships to vocational functioning.
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Chapter 9: Results
Sample Characteristics
This sample is derived from data from a randomized controlled trial comparing a group
treatment for internalized stigma to supportive group therapy for individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Participants were recruited from two partial hospitalization
programs at Rutgers University Behavioral Healthcare, one outpatient mental health clinic at
Rutgers University Behavioral Healthcare, an outpatient mental health clinic at the Indianapolis
VA, and an outpatient mental health clinic in Indianapolis.
Of the larger trial which included a total of 177 participants, this analysis restricted the
full sample to participants who completed assessments at both baseline (Time 1) and at posttreatment (Time 2). This yielded a total of 116 participants who completed assessments at both
time points and excluded 61 participants - 58 due to missing data at Time 2 (T2), and three who
did not receive STAND ratings at Time 1 (T1) due to interviews with insufficient information
required for a STAND rating.
As seen in Tables 1 and 2, participants were a mean age of 47.10 (SD = 11.73; range =
21 - 71), completed an average of 12.11 years of education (SD = 2.33; range = 3 - 18), and were
predominantly single (84%). With regard to gender, the sample slightly skewed toward male
(59%); the remaining participants (41%) identified as female. Over half of the sample (n=77, 66
%) was African-American, less than a quarter (22%) of the sample identified as European
American (n=26), four percent reported their race as Latino/Hispanic (n = 5), nearly three
percent identified as Asian American or Other and less than two percent reported their race as
Native American (n = 2). The total number of lifetime psychiatric hospitalizations widely varied
from zero to 100, with an average of approximately nine admissions and a median of four
hospitalizations. Study participants were a mean age of 24 and a median age of 22 at the time of
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their first psychiatric hospitalization. As determined by the Structured Clinical Interview of
Diagnosis (SCID), 65% of the sample (n=75) met diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia while the
remaining 35% met criteria for schizoaffective disorder (n=41). The overwhelming majority of
the sample (89%) denied any psychiatric hospitalizations within the three months prior to
completing the baseline study assessment. Refer to Tables 1 and 2 for additional information on
the demographic characteristics of this study sample.

Table 3 presents the distribution of study variables including the score range, average
values, and standard deviations. To assess the normality of the variables shown in Table 3,
skewness and kurtosis statistics were calculated and converted into z scores for interpretation. A
variable was considered significantly skewed if the z-score exceeded the absolute value of three.
The following baseline variables, Global Work Ratings, Internalized Stigma Total Score, and
PANSS Negative Symptom Subscale, demonstrated asymmetric distributions (i.e., z scores ≥ 3)
and QLS Instrumental Functioning revealed a significantly skewed and kurtotic distribution. The
post-treatment variables, Global Work Rating, Internalized Stigma Total Score, PANSS
Negative Symptom Subscale, and the QLS Instrumental Subscale similarly revealed non-normal,
skewed distributions.

Demographic Differences in STAND Scores
The study conducted statistical analyses to evaluate demographic correlates of baseline
STAND scores. Independent samples t-test evaluated whether baseline STAND variables
significantly differed by gender (male/female) and marital status. As shown in Table 4, no
significant differences emerged between males and females on any of the baseline STAND
measures. Marital status, coded into two groups, single and married or living with a partner, also
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did not significantly impact narrative development (see Table 4). Of note, the sample sizes were
extremely uneven as nearly 90% of the sample (n = 103) identified as single and approximately
10% of the sample (n = 13) as living with a partner or married.
A one-way ANOVA examined possible differences in STAND mean scores by racial
group. Since there were not enough participants in the following racial groups -Latino/Hispanic, Asian-American, Other, and Native American -- to allow for reliable
comparisons, these racial groups were categorized as “Other” for the purpose of this analysis.
The ANOVA compared Black/African-American participants (n = 77), White/Caucasian
participants (n = 26), and Other participants (n = 13) and found that STAND mean scores,
including STAND subscales, did not differ based on racial group membership, F (2,113) = .78, p
= .46.
Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to examine relationships between
STAND mean scores and age, education and history of hospitalizations. As shown in Table 5,
Greater educational attainment was linked to higher STAND total (r =.30, p < .01), STAND
Alienation (r = .19, p < 05), STAND Agency (r = .27, p < .01), and STAND Social Worth scores
(r = .32, p < .05), which is inconsistent with previous research finding no correlation between
STAND scores and education (Lysaker & Buck, 2008; Lysaker & Buck, 2006; Lysaker & Davis,
2005). In contrast to some research demonstrating a relationship between age and STAND scores
(Lysaker & Davis., 2005), the age of participants did not significantly correlate with STAND
scores in this sample. Similarly, history of average psychiatric hospitalizations and mean age
during first admission were not related to STAND scores.
To measure whether STAND average scores varied by psycho-diagnostic group, an
independent t-test revealed that differences in STAND total scores and STAND Illness
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Awareness scores trended toward statistical significance at p values of .07 and .06 respectively
(see Table 6). More specifically, individuals diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder were more
likely, at a trend significance level, to have higher STAND total and STAND Illness Conception
scores.
A series of correlational analyses evaluated baseline Scale to Assess Narrative
Development (STAND) scores with the variables included in the study’s analyses. A one-way
ANOVA examined treatment site between the five research sites -- two partial hospitalization
programs, one Veterans Affairs psychosocial rehabilitation program, and two outpatient mental
health clinics. The analysis of variance showed that STAND mean scores did not significantly
vary by research site, F (4, 111) = 13.63, p = .23. Given the similarities in services provided by
the mental health clinics and the day programs (PHPs and psychosocial rehabilitation program),
the research sites were split into two categories – outpatient clinics and day programs. An
independent samples t-test was conducted to compare STAND mean scores between individuals
receiving treatment at outpatient clinics versus day programs. As seen in Table 7, STAND scores
did not significantly differ between day program participants and outpatient clinic participants.
As shown in Table 8, bivariate correlations were conducted between the Scale to Assess
Narrative Development (STAND) scores at baseline and self-report measures of recovery factors
at both assessment points (baseline and post-treatment). STAND variables were not statistically
significantly associated to hopelessness at both time points. In contrast to Lysaker and Buck’s
finding (2006) that motivational hope (a subscale of the BHS) demonstrated significant
correlations to STAND subscales of Alienation, Agency, and total score, hopelessness, as
measured by the BHS, did not show any other significant associations to STAND variables.
Consistent with previous research (Cartwright, 2014), baseline self-esteem showed a small

60
positive relationship to STAND social worth, such that as self-esteem improved, one’s belief in
having perceived importance to close others also improved.
Baseline total internalized stigma scores demonstrated a small negative association (r = .25, p < .05) to STAND agency; as total self-stigma scores decreased, agency scores increased.
Follow-up total internalized stigma scores showed small but significant correlations to STAND
total score (r = -.22, p < .05) and similarly to STAND agency (r = -.29, p < .01) and STAND
Social Worth (r = -.20, p < .05). Of the four internalized stigma subscale scores evaluated,
Discrimination Experiences and Stereotype Endorsement yielded the greatest number of
relationships to STAND variables. Discrimination Experience scores at follow-up were
negatively associated with STAND total scores (r = -.26, p < .01), STAND Alienation (r = -.20,
p < .05), and STAND Agency (r = -28, p < .01), suggesting that as discrimination experiences
were more frequently endorsed, personal narrative ratings decreased. Baseline Stereotype
Endorsement scores negatively correlated with STAND total scores (r = -.19, p <.05), and
STAND Illness Conception ratings (r = -30, p < .01). All STAND subscales, including STAND
total scores, showed a small-moderate relationship to stereotype endorsement (see Table 8). That
is, as individuals endorsed and applied stereotypes about mental illness, their personal narratives
were less developed and more impoverished, particularly STAND Agency (r = -.32, p < .01).
Social Withdrawal at both assessment points did not correlate with any of the STAND variables.
Baseline Alienation self-stigma scores negatively correlated with STAND Agency; as
individuals reported higher levels of alienation (i.e., feeling like an outsider due to having a
mental illness), their STAND agency scores decreased.
Bivariate correlational analyses were also conducted to investigate associations between
STAND variables and coping strategies. As shown in Table 9, of the three coping categories
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evaluated, problem-centered coping strategies emerged as the categories with the greatest
number of statistically significant small-to-moderate correlations. As participants reported using
problem-centered coping strategies more often at follow-up, the following STAND variables
increased (STAND total r = .32, p < .01; STAND Agency r = .28, p < .01; STAND Social
Worth r = .25, p < .05; STAND Illness Conception r = .25, p < .05). Problem centered coping
scores at baseline was positively associated with one STAND subscale, Illness Conception, such
that as problem centered coping scores increased, STAND Illness Conception scores improved.
Neutral coping strategies at follow-up, and not at baseline, demonstrated positive relationships to
the following STAND variables: STAND total (r = .29, p < .01); STAND Alienation (r = .23, p
< .05); STAND Agency (r = .27, p < .01) and STAND Social Worth (r = .21, p < .05).
Quality of Life total scores at baseline and post-treatment yielded statistically
significantly positive small to moderate associations with all STAND subscales (r = .21 - .37, p
< .05) with the exception of STAND Agency scores. As shown in Table 10, all of the QLS
subscales demonstrated some relationships to different STAND values.
Of the three symptom clusters assessed in the PANSS, positive symptoms, negative
symptoms, and general psychopathology, negative symptoms were more frequently negatively
related to STAND scores such that as STAND scores improved, negative symptoms ratings
decreased (lower ratings reflect less symptomatology), with correlations ranging from r = -.20 to
r = -.39 (p < .05). General psychopathology ratings yielded fewer statistically significant
correlations to STAND ratings and hence, did not covary with personal narrative ratings to the
same extent as negative and positive symptoms.
Due to the lack of normal distributions for the work and instrumental variables, this
analysis relied on non-parametric correlations to study associations between STAND scores and
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these variables. As revealed in Table 11, as post-treatment work ratings improved (as reflected
by lower scores), all STAND variables demonstrated higher ratings – STAND total score (r = .31, p < .01), STAND Illness Conception (r = -.24, p < .05), STAND Alienation (r = -.24, p <
.05), STAND Agency (r = -.21, p < .05) and STAND Social Worth (r = -.19, p < .05). Similarly,
QLS Instrumental Functioning scores also related to all of the STAND subscales, such that as
instrumental ratings increased, personal narrative scores also increased.
Global work ratings and QLS Instrumental Functioning scores at baseline showed that as
work and instrumental functioning improved, the following STAND variables – STAND Total,
STAND Illness Conception, and STAND Social Worth – also improved. The magnitude of these
correlations between STAND scores and work functioning remained small (see Table 11).
Changes in the Scale to Assess Narrative Development
To test the first hypothesis, that participants will evidence personal narrative
improvements from Time 1 to Time 2, t-tests were performed. Table 12 shows the results of the
paired samples t-test between the Scale to Assess Narrative Development (STAND) scores at
baseline and post-treatment. In addition to examining change in the overall STAND scores, the ttests also examined changes in the four subscales of the STAND – Illness Conception,
Alienation, Agency, and Social Worth (see Figure 1). Contrary to hypothesis 1, none of the
comparisons reached statistical significance, suggesting that STAND mean scores did not
significantly differ between Time 1 and Time 2.

As seen in Table 13, a between subjects ANOVA analysis was conducted to evaluate
whether hypothesized changes in the self-experience varied by intervention group assignment
(Narrative Enhance Cognitive Therapy vs. Supportive Group Therapy). There were no
significant differences in personal narrative changes as measured by the Scale to Assess
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Narrative Development (STAND) by intervention group. This finding makes sense in light of the
previous null finding that STAND scores did not show any statistically significant changes from
Time 1 to Time 2.
STAND as a mediator between self-stigma and self-esteem
To examine hypothesis 2, a stepwise regression analysis evaluated the relationship
between self-stigma experience as measured by the Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Scale
(ISMIS) and self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), controlling
for baseline self-esteem scores. As seen in Table 14, in the first stage of the regression analysis,
baseline self-esteem significantly contributed to the overall regression model, F (1,112) = 59.06,
p < .001, accounting for 35% of the variation in post-treatment self-esteem scores. In the second
step of the regression, while the overall model remained significant, F (2,111) = 30.30, p < .001,
the addition of total self-stigma score at baseline (ISMIS) did not significantly contribute to
explaining the variance in post-treatment self-esteem scores (β =-.10, p = .25). Hence, these
results did not support hypothesis 2, that self-stigma at baseline will relate to self-esteem at the
post-treatment time point. As such, further mediation analyses were not possible because the
direct effect of baseline self stigma scores to follow-up self-esteem scores was not found.
Follow-up exploratory regression analyses that included four subscales of the Internalized
Stigma Mental Illness Scale at baseline – alienation, discrimination experience, stereotype
endorsement, and social withdrawal – failed to improve the model fit and did not statistically
significantly add to the model.
STAND and coping
A two-step hierarchical regression analysis was carried out to test hypothesis 3 - that selfexperience at Time 1 would statistically significant predict the use of problem-centered coping
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strategies at Time 2 after adjusting for baseline covariates (problem-centered coping strategy
score, PANSS ratings on positive, negative, and general psychopathology symptoms,
intervention group assignment [NECT or supportive therapy], self-stigma scores, and hope). In
the first model containing the control variables, a significant regression model was identified, F
(7,87) = 5.90, p < .001, R2=.32. Problem-centered coping and negative symptoms at baseline
both emerged as statistically significant predictors of problem-centered coping at follow-up in
the expected directions (βproblemcoping=.46, p<.001; βnegativesymptoms=-.20, p<.05). Baseline personal
narrative scores were entered into the second block of the analysis. The model remained
statistically significant, F (8,86) = 6.36, p < .001, R2 = .37 and an additional five percent of the
variance in problem-centered coping scores at T2 was explained. However, baseline negative
symptoms no longer statistically significantly predicted problem-centered coping at follow-up.
Consistent with hypothesis 3, baseline personal narrative scores statistically significantly
predicted the use of problem-centered coping strategies at follow-up, such that more developed
and enriched personal narrative predicted increased reports of using problem-centered coping
strategies at T2 (β=.26, p<.05).
In order to determine the extent to which the STAND subscales – alienation, social
worth, agency, and illness conception – contributed to the statistically significant finding that
baseline personal narrative scores explained some variance in problem-centered coping strategies
at time 2, stepwise regression analyses evaluated each STAND subscale’s contribution to the
regression equation. This regression equation remained statistically significant, F (11,83) = 5.16,
p < .001, and cumulatively explained 41% of the variance observed in problem-centered coping
strategies. As shown in Table 15, the social worth subscale of the STAND emerged as the only
statistically significant contributor of all the STAND subscales (βsocialworth = .22, p < .05), which
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suggests that individuals with increased levels of social worth are more likely to report the
utilization of problem-centered coping strategies. In contrast to hypothesis 3, the remaining three
STAND subscales – alienation, agency, and illness conception – failed to statistically
significantly predict the outcome variable, problem-centered coping, at follow-up.
To examine the degree to which STAND subscales at baseline – alienation and agency predicted the use of avoidant coping strategies at follow-up (after controlling for identified
covariates at Time 1), a regression analysis was conducted to test hypothesis 3a. As shown in
Table 16, the first step of the regression, which included variables hypothesized to account for
variance in the prediction of avoidant coping, revealed a significant regression model F(7,87) =
7.44, p < .001, R2 = .37. As shown in Table 8, avoidant coping ( = .39, t(84) = 4.14, p < .001),
general psychopathology ( = .31, t(84) =2.33, p = .02), internalized mental health stigma ( =
.19, t(84) =2.03, p = .05), and hopelessness ( = .19, t(84) =1.99, p = .05) were identified as
statistically significant predictors of T2 avoidant coping, such that increased reporting of T1
avoidant coping, increased internalized stigma scores, increased hopelessness and greater general
psychopathology predicted the use of avoidant coping strategies. With the addition of the
hypothesized STAND variables in Model 2 – agency and alienation, the overall model remained
significant F(9,85) = 6.56, p < .001, R2 = .41; however hypothesis 3a (decreased alienation and
increased agency will predict the decreased use of T2 avoidant coping) was not supported.
Contrary to the hypothesis, agency statistically significantly predicted T2 avoidant coping in the
opposite direction, such that increased agency predicted higher avoidant coping scores ( =
.20, t(84) = 2.17, p = .03), however the additional explained variance did not yield a statistically
significant change in R2. Additionally, contrary to the hypothesis, baseline alienation did not
emerge as a statistically significant predictor of post-treatment avoidant coping.
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For hypotheses 3b, no specific hypotheses were proposed regarding the impact of
personal narrative scores on neutral coping scores. As observed in Table 17, the first step of the
regression model included covariates which yielded a significant regression model, explaining
30% of the variance in T2 neutral coping scores, F (7,87) = 5.39, p < .001. More specifically,
increased T1 neutral coping scores, elevated scores of internalized stigma of mental illness, and
decreased negative symptoms statistically significantly predicted higher neutral coping scores. In
the second step of the regression model, STAND total score at T1 was added to the equation
which emerged as a statistically significant predictor of T2 neutral coping ( = .31, t(86) =
3.21, p < .001) and explained an additional eight percent of variance in neutral coping scores
(F(8,86) = 6.51, p < .001, R2= .38). That is, with more developed narratives at T1, participants
reported the increased use of neutral coping strategies at T2. To examine specific STAND
subscales on neutral coping at follow-up, a third regression model revealed that the overall
regression model remained significant (F(11,83) = 5.06, p < .001, R2 = .40), and that baseline
STAND agency significantly contributed to follow-up neutral coping scores ( = .23, t(86) =
2.12, p = .04). Hence, participants with higher ratings of agency at baseline reported the
increased use of neutral coping strategies at follow-up. The remaining three STAND subscales,
illness conception, alienation, and social worth, did not significantly predict neutral coping
scores at follow-up.
Hypothesis 3c was evaluated to determine whether changes in personal narrative scores
from baseline to follow-up statistically corresponded to changes in coping scores from baseline
to follow-up. First, in order to account for baseline scores, residualized change scores were
calculated for coping and STAND variables utilizing baseline scores as the predictor variable
and follow-up scores as the outcome variable. In light of previous analyses that demonstrated the
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lack of statistically significant changes from baseline to follow-up scores for STAND variables,
it remains unsurprising that nearly all of the correlations between personal narrative ratings and
coping scores were statistically insignificant (refer to Table 18). Nonetheless, the association
between alienation and neutral coping was statistically significant. As alienation scores improved
(i.e., reduced alienation), the reported use of avoidant based coping strategies decreased at a
statistically significant level (r = -.22, p < .05).
STAND and hopelessness

A hierarchical regression analysis was carried out to test whether more developed
personal narratives at baseline predict decreased hopelessness at follow-up (Hypothesis 4). In the
first block of the regression analysis which included hypothesized covariates, the overall
regression model was significant, F (7, 104) = 5.58, p < .001, R2 = .27. As shown in Table 19,
hopelessness and self-esteem scores at T1 statistically significantly predicted hopelessness scores
at T2; as participants reported decreased T1 hopelessness and increased T1 self-esteem,
hopelessness at T2 decreased, hope = .33, t(104) = 3.63, p < .001 and self-esteem = -.24, t(104) = 2.41, p < .05. In the second block, the addition of T1 personal narrative scores did not improve
the model’s fit, F (8, 103) = 4.90, p < .001, R2 = .27. Hypothesis 4 was not supported as personal
narrative scores at T1 failed to statistically significantly predict hopelessness scores at T2,  = .05, t(103) = -.57, p = .86. Similarly, STAND subscales also failed to individually predict the
variance in follow-up hopelessness scores.
In order to evaluate hypothesis 5, that changes in hopelessness from T1 to T2 would
positively relate to changes in personal narrative scores, a bivariate correlation found that
residualized change in hopelessness did not significantly associate with any of the personal
narrative residualized change scores (Table 20). Hence, hypothesis 5 was not supported and
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remains unsurprising due to the failure to identify statistically significant changes in these
variables from T1 to T2 in t-test analyses.
Hypothesis 6 posited that personal narrative scores at baseline would demonstrate a
statistically significantly positive relationship to interpersonal and vocational ratings. A
hierarchical regression analysis was employed to first examine predictors of interpersonal
functioning as assessed by the Heinrichs Quality of Life Scale (QLS). First, the overall T2 score
on the Quality of Life scale served as the outcome variable and covariates included T1 QLS
score, psychopathology as measured by the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, self-esteem
as obtained by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and hopelessness as measured by the Beck
Hopelessness Scale. As seen in Table 21, this regression model was significant, F (7, 101) =
13.47, p < .001. These predictors explained 48% of the variance observed in quality of life at
Time 2; however, quality of life at Time 1 emerged as the only statistically significant predictor
in the equation, β = .66, t (101) = 7.43, p < .001. In the second step of the regression model,
introducing personal narrative total scores at Time 1 explained an additional three percent of
variance in quality of life scores at Time 2; this change in R2 was statistically significant, F (8,
100) = 12.74, p < .001. As hypothesized, personal narrative scores at baseline statistically
significantly added to the prediction of quality of life Time 2 scores, such that more developed
narratives at T1 predicted improved quality of life scores at T2, β = .17, t (100) = 2.12, p = .04.
To assess whether specific STAND (personal narrative) subscales explained the
statistically significant finding that the STAND total score at T1 predicted interpersonal
functioning at T2, a third regression analysis added the STAND subscales – Illness Conception,
Alienation, Agency, and Social Worth – into the second step of the equation. Contrary to
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expectation (see Table 21), none of the STAND subscales demonstrated significant relationships
to the outcome variable, interpersonal functioning at T2.
Four separate regression analyses then examined the extent to which personal narrative
scores at T1, after adjusting for covariates, explained the prediction of scores on the four
subscales of the Heinrichs Quality of Life Scale (QLS) at T2 including interpersonal,
intrapsychic, instrumental, and common objects and activities subscales. In the first step of the
regression equation, hypothesized predictor variables were selected including QLS interpersonal,
QLS intrapsychic, QLS instrumental, QLS common objects and activities, Rosenberg Self
Esteem Scale, Beck Hopelessness Scale, PANSS General Psychopathology, PANSS Positive
Symptoms, PANSS Negative Symptoms, and group assignment (NECT or supportive therapy)..
As shown in Table 22, the introduction of personal narrative scores at T1 into the set of predictor
variables at step 2 failed to explain any significant variance in the prediction of T2 QLS subscale
ratings. Personal narrative scores at T1 did not statistically significantly predict any of the four
quality of life subscales as observed in Table 22.
To determine whether baseline personal narrative ratings contributed to the variance
observed in work ratings at follow-up after controlling for covariates (T1 work rating, T1
psychiatric symptoms, T1 self-esteem, and group assignment), a stepwise regression analysis
was employed (see Table 23). Contrary to expectation, baseline STAND scores failed to
significantly explain any additional variance in work ratings at T2 after accounting for covariates
in the first regression step. While both of the models demonstrated statistical significance, Model
1 F (7,101) = 5.61, p < .001 and Model 2 F (8, 100) = 5.39, p < .001, global work rating at
baseline drove the statistically significant finding.
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To test hypothesis 6a, correlational analyses were conducted to examine associations
between residualized change scores of personal narrative ratings (Scale to Assess Narrative
Development from baseline to follow-up) and residualized change scores of objective quality of
life (Heinrichs Quality of Life Scale from baseline to follow-up) and vocational scores
(Multidimensional Scale of Independent Functioning – Global Work Rating from baseline to
follow-up). Table 24 presents the patterns of correlations between subjective indicators of
recovery (personal narrative ratings) and objective measures of recovery including work, day-today, and interpersonal functioning. This hypothesis was partially supported. As observed in
Table 24, work change scores demonstrated small but significant negative correlations to the
social worth (r = -.20, p = .04) and alienation (r = -.24, p = .01) change scores of the STAND
indicating that as participants’ employment functioning improved (as reflected by lower work
ratings), reduced levels of alienation (as reflected by higher ratings) and improved social worth
were reported. Work rating change scores did not significantly correlate with the total STAND
change score, STAND Alienation subscale, and STAND Illness Conception.
Improved quality of life was positively associated with healthier personal narratives as
captured by the STAND total score (r = .22, p = .02), higher ratings of illness conception (r =
.19, p = .05), and enhanced personal agency (r = .20, p = .04). The intrapsychic and
commonplace objects and activities subscales of the QLS did not correlate with any of the
personal narrative ratings. Better interpersonal functioning (as measured by the QLS) was related
to more agency(r = .23, p = .01), improved illness conception (r = .22, p = .02), and more
developed overall personal narrative scores (r = .22, p = .02). Instrumental functioning (i.e.,
current societal functioning) scores increased as social worth improved (r = .22, p = .02).
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To test hypothesis 6b, regression mediation analyses (refer to Baron & Kenny, 1986)
examined whether any of the self-experience variables at baseline (Scale to Assess Narrative
Development [STAND] Total, STAND Illness Conception, STAND Agency, STAND
Alienation, STAND Social Worth) mediated the relationship between baseline self-stigma scores
(Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Scale [ISMIS] Total) and post-treatment vocational
ratings (Multidimensional Scale of Independent Functioning [MSIF] Global Working Rating).
A direct relationship was found between baseline internalized stigma and post-treatment
work ratings (after controlling for baseline work rating), F (2,108) = 23.65, p < .001, R2=.29 (see
Table 25). The higher baseline self-stigma scores, the higher the global work rating score
(equivalent to reduced work functioning). Next, as predicted, baseline total self-stigma scores
significantly predicted baseline STAND agency, F(1,114) = 5.62, R2=.04, such that greater selfstigma was linked to reduced levels of agency (β = -.22, p<.05; see Table 26 and Figure 2).
However, no significant relationship emerged between baseline STAND Agency and post
treatment work ratings (Table 27) and hence, the mediation was not supported. Of note, the
following baseline STAND variables – Total, Illness Conception, Alienation, and Social Worth –
did not mediate baseline total self-stigma scores and post-treatment vocational functioning
because baseline total self-stigma scores did not statistically significantly predict these baseline
STAND ratings.
Next, another set of regression analyses investigated whether any of the baseline STAND
variables mediated the relationship between any of the baseline ISMIS subscales –
discrimination experiences, stereotype endorsement, social withdrawal, and alienation and posttreatment vocational scores. Given the absence of any significant direct effect between selfstigma subscales and post-treatment work ratings, a mediation analysis was unable to be tested.
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Chapter 10: Discussion
This study evaluated whether components of the self-experience as assessed through
personal narrative added to the prediction of objective and subjective features of mental health
recovery in a sample of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The
prospective design of this study allowed for comparisons and analyses across two separate time
points.
STAND Changes
Relative to prior research examining the STAND, this study extended the use of the
STAND to a more diverse sample that included a higher proportion of females and AfricanAmericans. Despite demographic differences in this sample compared to previous samples
evaluating the STAND (primarily white and male), the STAND values obtained in this study
were similar to those reported by other researchers (Lysaker et al., 2006). The similar STAND
mean scores among individuals with different demographic characteristics suggest that the
STAND can be successfully utilized in heterogeneous samples. Of the demographic variables
evaluated, individuals with higher educational attainment were more likely to retell narratives
that involved meaningful relationships to others, perceptions of feeling valued by others, and the
belief in one’s capacity to influence events occurring in their lives. While these findings are in
contrast to prior research documenting no link between education and narrative development
(Lysaker et al., 2005; Lysaker et al., 2008; Lysaker et al., 2006), perhaps the markedly larger
sample size in this study (previously cited studies yielded between 25 to 51 participants)
allowed for this relationship to emerge.
Contrary to H1, the evidence did not suggest that participants’ narratives changed, on
average, from baseline assessment to post-treatment nor did narrative development vary by
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intervention group (NECT vs. supportive group therapy). An improvement in STAND scores
was expected to occur over time because participants were exposed to treatment interventions as
well as their standard psychiatric care that were anticipated to enhance an individual’s narrative
expression. Possible explanations for the failure to detect STAND score gains may include the
relatively short follow-up period and the need for longer intervals between assessments to detect
a demonstrable impact. Change in narrative content assessed in previous case study methodology
has revealed that such improvements may require periods longer than five months to surface with
a change process that relies on other factors like narrative structure that demonstrate a jagged yet
positively trending curve (Lysaker et al., 2005, Lysaker & Buck, 2006).
Hypothesis 2 was also not supported by the analyses, in that self-stigma scores at baseline
did not explain self-esteem ratings at follow-up. No further mediation analyses were conducted
to explore the mediational role of personal narrative on this proposed connection. Given the
plethora of evidence and theoretical knowledge that reductions in self-stigma result in related
decreases in self-esteem ratings, these findings are unexpected because people who internalize
negative mental illness stereotypes have been shown to evaluate themselves as less valued and
less important (Link, Struening, Neese-Todd, Asmussen, & Phelan, 2001; Corrigan et al., 2006).
The self-stigma associated with having a mental illness ruptures self-esteem by diminishing
one’s belief in the capacity to think positively about oneself. A possible explanation for the lack
of association between self-stigma and self-esteem may be that since both of these variables were
directly targeted by the treatment interventions, the baseline self-stigma values may not have
been related to follow-up self-esteem ratings.
Personal narrative and coping
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The analyses assessing coping strategies revealed significant relationships to components
of the self-experience. Due to the nature of the scale addressing coping activities with active
symptoms, only individuals with symptoms in at least one of five domains (depression, anxiety,
mania, delusions, hallucinations) at the time of the study assessment were included in this
analysis (n = 96). Of the coping types set forth by Schwarzer as described by Roe, Yanos, and
Lysaker (2006), the coping strategies evaluated in this study fell under reactive coping, as the
strategies address a response to a stressful situation (i.e., symptoms).
Problem-centered coping
Problem-centered coping strategies include efforts to utilize social supports, cognitive
and self-monitoring strategies (i.e., “recognize unrealistic thoughts”), distraction efforts (i.e.,
physical exercise), and the use of medication. As expected (H3), individuals with fuller personal
narratives at baseline assessment showed a greater likelihood of reporting problem-centered
coping strategies at follow-up. In contrast to hypothesis 3, baseline levels of agency, alienation
and illness awareness were not linked to follow-up problem-centered coping. Alternatively,
individuals that narrated stories with greater social worth were more likely to engage in problemcentered coping at follow up. Social worth emerged as the only baseline personal narrative
predictor of problem-centered coping, such that having value to others facilitated the use of
problem centered coping strategies.
As Yanos et al. (2001) found in their initial validation study of this coping measure,
participants rated their use of problem-centered coping strategies as particularly helpful ways of
effectively dealing with their symptoms. Though speculative, perhaps individuals perceiving that
their contributions matter to others may experience greater motivation to successfully manage
their active symptoms so that these symptoms do not interfere with their ability to serve and
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support their close others. That is, in the service of maintaining helpful and valued connections
to others, participants may have been drawn toward coping activities that provided them with
symptom relief most efficiently. Alternatively, the social-cognitive model of social support
(Penn et al., 2004), which posits that social support plays a beneficial role as individuals may
interact with others who may have and offer feedback to help the individual manage stressors.
That is, through social interactions and dialogues with valued others, the individual may
incorporate advice from others or learn from observing others’ behaviors regarding techniques to
cope with symptoms.
By its design, the coping with symptoms checklist excludes participants who do not
manifest any psychiatric symptoms, which may have limited the heterogeneity of the study
sample and by extension, the possibility of detecting an effect. In attempting to speculate why
this study did not find certain hypothesized effects, it may be that individuals engaging in
problem-centered coping will develop narratives with greater agency if they observe that these
strategies produce desired consequences over time (i.e., breathing exercises reduce my level of
anxiety). From a learning perspective, it may take repeated practice with new skills to modify a
persons’ perception of themselves as individuals with agency, rather than the necessity of more
agency to precede the use of problem-centered coping strategies. Perhaps problem centered
coping precedes or comes before the development of a more agentic narrative and it takes time
for the utilization of specific strategies to come to see self as agentic. Similarly, despite
expectation, harboring meaningful social connections with others (alienation) at baseline did not
explain the use of problem-centered coping at follow-up. Perhaps ties to others as understood in
the telling of one’s life does not increase the likelihood of adopting problem-centered coping
skills, even those that include the use of social supports. Other hypotheses on the relationship
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between alienation and problem-centered coping may be that the temporal connection is reversed
– that, the use of problem-centered coping strategies for distressing symptoms fosters intimacy
and closeness with other people. Illness conception at baseline also did not contribute to the
prediction of post-treatment problem-centered coping.
Despite failing to find relationships with some of the narrative components (alienation,
illness conception, agency), the self-experience overall and social worth in particular, appear to
influence the choice to utilize problem-centered coping strategies.
Avoidant and Neutral Coping
Individuals who engage in avoidant coping may isolate themselves, use addictive
substances, experience outbursts, “go along with the symptom” (e.g., for mania, “enjoy the
feeling;” Yanos, Knight, & Bremer, 2003) and feel helpless in controlling the symptom.
Contrary to hypothesis 3b, alienation at baseline did not factor into the explanation of avoidant
coping and surprisingly, agency at baseline was significantly related to avoidant coping at posttreatment in the opposite direction. Participants perceiving themselves with influence and control
over their life’s course were more likely to use avoidant coping techniques to manage symptoms.
Of note, baseline covariates that emerged as significant predictors of avoidant centered coping
included increased general psychopathology, greater levels of self-stigma, and higher levels of
hopelessness. When agency and alienation were entered into the regression equation, only selfstigma remained a significant predictor. That is, participants with greater levels of self-stigma
and higher ratings of agency were more likely to use avoidant coping strategies. Consistent with
previous literature on coping styles among individuals with elevated self-stigma, the use of
avoidant coping to manage symptoms is in keeping with the idea that self-stigma can erode one’s
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sense of effectiveness to act on the world (i.e., because I have a mental illness, I am useless;
Corrigan et al., 2009; Kleim et al., 2008).
Neutral coping strategies primarily include emotional acceptance of the symptom (“wait
for it to pass”) and efforts to distract oneself (i.e., watching television). No hypotheses were
posited regarding the prospective relationship of narrative development and neutral coping
strategies. In addition to the finding that individuals with higher levels of internalized stigma at
baseline were predicted to report greater frequency of neutral coping strategies at post-treatment,
those with more enriched baseline narratives were more likely to utilize neutral coping strategies
as well. Similar to the result regarding avoidant coping and greater personal agency, persons with
greater agency at baseline were more likely to utilize neutral coping strategies at follow-up.
Of note, a similar pattern of significant predictors, greater internalized stigma and
increased agency, were related to the increased use of avoidant and neutral coping strategies at
follow-up. This suggests that similar processes may act to lead to the reported use of these
strategies. It may be that individuals who apply negative stereotypes about mental illness to their
own personal narratives and exhibit a greater sense of personal agency show a tendency to utilize
more coping neutral and avoidant coping strategies (relative to individuals with decreased
agency). These coping skills have been rated as less helpful in managing symptoms compared to
problem-centered coping strategies which could potentially be explained by the higher ratings of
self-stigma (i.e., because I have a mental illness, my coping skills repertoire is limited
to…,Yanos, 2003). Or, perhaps one has internalized the roles and expectations aligned with a
“mentally ill” person, deciding to cope in ways consistent with an individual with a stigmatized
identity. Another possibility may be that other factors not evaluated and included in this study,
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such as metacognitive ability and neurocognitive functioning, could shed light on this
paradoxical and interesting finding.
Hopelessness
The element of hope in facilitating recovery-oriented outcomes has been welldocumented and researched (Leamy et al., 2014). Contrary to expectation (H4), the selfexperience at baseline did not influence hopelessness at follow-up; however, in keeping with
previous research (Yanos et al., 2013), participants espousing higher levels of baseline selfesteem reported diminished levels of hopelessness at follow-up. Consistent with the lack of a
predictive relationship between personal narrative and hopelessness, a previous cross-sectional
study demonstrated that hope did not add any unique contributions to the variance of personal
narrative scores (Lysaker et al., 2006). Nonetheless it was expected that a longitudinal design
examining these variables would demonstrate that a greater connectedness to one’s sense of self
(i.e., connectedness and value to others, belief in affecting and having control over events in
one’s life) would engender less hopelessness about the future (Kylma et al., 2006).
In an effort to make sense of these findings, perhaps Lysaker and Buck’s (2006)
distinction of an individual’s evaluation of their resources (including future possibilities) from
their experience of themselves may offer a possible explanation for the failure to find a
predictive relationship between the self-experience and hopelessness. In other words, while both
factors can be subsumed under subjective components of recovery, an individual’s assessment of
their external resources, satisfaction with their role functioning, and hope for future possibilities
may not map onto an individual’s evaluation of themselves as related to their identity.
Alternatively, it may be that participants exhibiting reduced hopelessness at baseline are more
likely to produce more enriched and developed narratives prospectively such that having greater
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optimism enables people to perceive themselves as more capable and valued persons in the
world. That is, the temporal order of these variables hypothesized in this study (self experience
→ hope) may be reversed. Additionally, these variables may demonstrate simultaneous change
where a shift in one variable does not precede a shift in the second variable. These speculations
ought to be evaluated empirically in an effort to clarify whether a relationship between these
variables is found and whether there is a clear order in which change unfolds.
Hypothesis 5 was also not supported. As revealed in previous analyses in this study,
STAND scores did not markedly shift from T1 to T2 and hence, the failure to find statistically
significant correlations between hopelessness scores and STAND scores when controlling for T1
values remains unsurprising. With a longer interval between T1 and T2, it can still be
hypothesized that changes in personal narrative may co-occur with changes in hopelessness.
Studies with longer intervals between assessment points may elucidate whether these factors
exhibit similar rates of change over time.
Social and work functioning
As anticipated (H6), STAND total baseline performance was predictive of overall social
functioning at post-treatment. To note, the STAND total only explained a small amount (three
percent) of variance in QLS scores after adjusting for covariates (of which QLS at T1 was the
only significant predictor).That is, study participants who demonstrated increased social worth to
others, a reasonable understanding of their illness, personal agency, and fulfilling interpersonal
relationships were more likely to evidence improved social functioning. Of note, neither the
STAND subscales nor the QLS subscales manifested any statistically significant relationships
between each other; only the composite scores of the STAND and QLS emerged in a statistically
significant relationship. This finding provides support for Lysaker’s et al. (2010) supposition that
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the ability to produce a narrative understood by others may help to maintain aspects of social
functioning. Individuals who possess more developed narratives may have an avenue by which
to reciprocally engage with others in a relationship as well as with activities in the individual’s
world. The specific narrative subscales did not drive the STAND total finding which lends
additional support to the notion that it may be the telling of the narrative itself that presents
advantages with respect to social functioning rather than particular narrative components.
Further, this finding contributes to the body of literature assessing linkages between subjective
and objective elements of recovery (Resnick, 2004), demonstrating that subjective indicators,
like the quality of one’s personal narrative, are longitudinally related to objective indicators, like
social functioning.
Of importance, the STAND and the Heinrichs Quality of Life Scale both encompass
multiple dimensions that complicate the specific conclusions derived from the finding that the
self-experience may play a causal role in an individual’s social and role functioning. Perhaps,
individuals possessing a fuller narrative are more likely to engage with life roles (i.e.,
interpersonal interactions, work/school pursuits) because their sense of self is developed enough
so that the outside world does not threaten their self as posited by some scholars (Laing, 1960).
It was unexpected that none of the STAND subscales separately contributed to the
explanation of total social functioning and of the subscales as measured by the Heinrichs Quality
of Life scale. While overall personal narrative score at baseline explained three percent of
variance in social functioning ratings, when analyzing the data for effects among subscales on
the STAND and quality of life scale, no significant effects were observed. A significant amount
of variance is captured in the overall quality of life score including the quality and quantity of
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interpersonal relationships, intrapsychic factors, and activities of daily living, which leads to
challenges in understanding what these findings reveal.
With regard to vocational outcomes, baseline personal narrative ratings did not explain
any of the variance observed in work ratings at post-treatment. A previous study conducted by
Cartwright (2014) revealed that individuals with less developed narratives at baseline showed an
increased likelihood of obtaining employment at eight months. These current findings do not
corroborate Cartwright’s results and may indicate that the follow-up period in this study was not
long enough to sufficiently evaluate the relationship between personal narrative and vocational
outcomes. Of note, the distribution of work ratings in this sample was heavily skewed as the
overwhelming majority of participants were not engaged in gainful employment. Increased
variability in employment ratings is important for future studies to further explore this
connection. The lack of a relationship may reflect that employment and the self-experience are
two separate components of the recovery experience that may not overlap.
In an effort to examine whether the self-experience mediates self-stigma and work
outcomes, a mediation analyses was conducted. Given the research linking higher degrees of
self-stigma to poorer vocational functioning (Corrigan et al., 2012), this study endeavored to
determine whether the way in which internalized stigma impacted narrative development would
help explain variation in work outcomes. For example, if an individual with high self-stigma
constructs a narrative with a reduced sense of agency, diminished social connections, and a
limited capacity to account for one’s mental health symptoms, it would be predicted that their
ability to secure employment would be compromised as their diminished narrative may not be
consistent with the self-experience as an “employee.” Internalized stigma scores at Time 1
emerged as significant predictors of both work functioning at Time 2 and STAND Agency at
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Time 1. It was hypothesized that personal narrative would mediate the effect of self-stigma on
vocational outcomes. That is, if self-stigma is thought to involve a process by which people
accept mental illness stereotypes including that people with mental illness are unable to work,
this study surmised that the self-stigma process would diminish the vitality of the self-experience
which would explain the mechanisms by which self-stigma adversely impacts work outcomes.
While self-stigma at Time 1 was associated with reduced agency at Time 1, agency did not
explain any of the variance in work functioning at Time 2 and thus, the mediation was not
supported. Nonetheless, this analysis replicates previous research that document the negative
impact of internalized mental health stigma on work outcomes.
Conclusions and Implications
This study sought to determine the prospective role of the self-experience on features of
mental health recovery and coping skills among individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia
spectrum disorders. This study demonstrated that certain aspects of the self-experience
prospectively predicted coping skills and social functioning. Particular components of the selfexperience, including perceived value to others and the belief in affecting outcomes over one’s
life, mattered with respect to the coping strategies choices reported by participants. This finding
makes the argument that the coping strategies people elect to use may depend on their
understanding and experience of themselves as beings interacting with the world. There is
further evidence for the combined role of internalized stigma and the self-experience on coping
strategies that merit further investigation. Another important finding related to the way in which
the self-experience factored into social functioning, a commonly used marker to gauge objective
treatment progress. Observing this link between subjective and objective measures of recovery
confirms the need to continue studying these elements concurrently to distinguish how these
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features interact. While other hypotheses were not supported by the data (i.e., mediational
relationships between self-stigma and self-esteem and self-stigma and work), this work can
nonetheless move the field forward by elucidating where the self plays a predictive role in
recovery outcomes. As such, this study highlights the importance of studying the self-experience
as a measure of both change and outcome.
Some researchers have proposed the inclusion of “empirically derived, patient-subjective
characteristics” into diagnostic manuals (i.e., Diagnostic Statistical Manual and International
Statistical Classification of Diseases), particularly incorporating the subjective loss of self in
schizophrenia into the diagnostic criteria (Flanagan, Davidson, & Strauss, 2010, p. 207).
Flanagan and her colleagues (2010) argued that the current editions of the DSM and ICD focus
too stringently on objective descriptors of disorders, coming at the expense of losing the
subjective and inner-experience of the person with the disorder. Namely, they noted that in
earlier editions of the DSM-III and DSM-III-R “disruptions in sense of self” was included in the
schizophrenia section, yet that feature was prematurely discarded in the shift toward objectivity
(“baby being thrown out with the bathwater” phenomena, p. 300). Of note, this project’s findings
support the argument for the inclusion of “empirically derived, patient subjective characteristics”
(Flanagan et al., 2010) such that the self-experience, which was removed from the diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia in the fourth edition of the DSM, merits consideration as a factor to
include in future diagnostic manuals. Also, schizophrenia is believed to be a heterogeneous
construct, with vastly different presentations and prognoses across individuals. More concerted
efforts to investigate the sense of self in schizophrenia, like this project, may better identify
subjective elements common to individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia that have the potential
to respond to treatment interventions.
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Limitations
While this study contributes to the growing literature on the self-experience in
schizophrenia, it is important acknowledge the limitations of this study. First, the sample
consisted of individuals who exhibited elevated levels of internalized stigma which limits
implications that can be drawn about how these variables function and interact among
individuals who do not present with mental illness self-stigma. An individual whose identity has
not been “infected” by the labels of having a mental illness may produce fundamentally different
relationships to the variables evaluated in this study. Moreover, the time elapsed between the
baseline and post-treatment assessments could have been too brief to identify meaningful
changes in personal narrative functioning. As noted by Lysaker (2005) and Adler (2012),
changes in narrative content (as a measure of the self-experience) may require more extended
follow-up periods to observe the change processes in the reconstruction of one’s narrative.
Absent these narrative changes, the hypotheses about associated changes with other recovery
indicators including social functioning, employment, coping skills, self-variables (self-esteem,
self-stigma), and hope remains preliminary at best. Future research ought to monitor these
variables over longer follow-up periods to elucidate the progression of change between these
variables. Doing so would further clarify the sequence of change with regard to whether the
changes in the self-experience gives way to improvement with particular variables and/or
whether self-experience improvements follow changes in other domains.
Additionally, while this study comprised self-report measures assessing different
elements of subjective recovery including hope and self-esteem, the study lacked an explicit
measure of overall subjective recovery (Corrigan, Giffort, Rashid, Leary, & Okeke, 1999) which
presents limitations in examining the ways in which the self-experience contributes to the
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process of recovery. A measure, like the Recovery Assessment Scale (Corrigan, Salzer, Ralph,
Sangster, & Keck, 2004) that captures the essence of subjective recovery in one scale would
enable future research to more directly examine how one’s understanding of oneself in the world
maps onto how recovery from mental illness.
Further, there are important variables connected to the self-experience that this study did
not investigate. The inclusion of a measure of narrative structure, or the organization of the
individual’s story, may have helped to clarify the unique contribution of narrative structure,
which has been reported to change prior to narrative content changes, and relate to mental health
recovery indicators.
Future Directions
This study offers additional empirical evidence that the self-experience among people
with schizophrenia warrants continued attention in recovery research. The self-experience
remains a vital target for research aiming to identify and address recovery features that are
amenable to improvement over time.
Based on the results of this study, there are several areas of research worthy of future
exploration. To continue to advance the knowledge base of the self-experience in schizophrenia,
future research directions may involve the examination of the self-experience at different stages
of illness, coping styles and self appraisals, and the connection and protective effects of personal
narrative formation and psychiatric symptoms. Of particular interest in following the course and
consequences of schizophrenia, studies that follow personal narrative formation from early
illness onset onwards (i.e., first episode or prodromal symptoms) could more precisely illustrate
the ways in which personal narrative is altered by the individual and social effects of
schizophrenia. This type of research could offer important clues regarding aspects of the self that
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are sensitive to change in the initial stages of illness progression. Questions that future research
can pose include, at what point in the illness phase does the self come undone? How does the
perseveration of the self buffer against the impact of schizophrenia on the individual?
Additionally, as this study revealed, different elements of the self-experience play a role
in the use of coping strategies for psychiatric symptoms. Further exploration that examines
coping styles in response to life stressors (in addition to symptoms) and the extent to which
individuals perceive the effectiveness of particular coping strategies would add further insights to
the relationship between how the self factors into handling stressful life events. Lastly, a
comparison of personal narrative functioning across individuals with varying levels of
internalized stigma may offer hypotheses about which parts of the self are diminished by the
self-stigma experience. This could spur continued treatment research that addresses techniques to
build personal narrative functioning in order to determine its impact on the recovery experience.
Another line of research germane to the self-experience involves the role of insight. The
topic of insight in schizophrenia, particularly its clinical implications and contribution to
recovery outcomes, remains vast and worthy of continued investigation in the context of
narrative development (Lysaker, Clements, Plascak-Hallberg, Knipscheer, & Wright, 2002). The
understanding of insight beyond discrete statements (i.e., acceptance of having a mental illness
and acknowledgement of the need for continued treatment) and rather, as part of a broader
narrative understanding about an individual’s life story and the ways in which incorporating the
mental illness experience into this story bears on an individual’s ability to achieve a rewarding
and meaningful life remains crucial. Future directions may endeavor to examine the differential
ways in which a traditional measure of insight (e.g., PANSS insight item) compares to narrative
measure of insight (e.g., STAND Illness Conception subscale) in predicting outcomes of mental
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health recovery.
Future investigations of this construct in schizophrenia have the potential to point to
processes that may undermine or enhance an individual’s journey toward recovery. How we
think of ourselves holistically as individuals in an interconnected world with goals and hopes,
intuitively, appears to impact our capacity to participate fully and meaningfully in society.
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Chapter 11: Tables and Figures
Table 1
Participant demographic information (continuous variables)
Age
Education
Number of previous
psychiatric
hospitalizations
Age at first
psychiatric
hospitalization

Range
21-71
3-18

Mean (SD) Median n
47.10(11.73) 49
116
12.11(2.33) 12
116

0-100

8.94(13.66)

4

116

5-52

23.58(9.92)

22

106
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Table 2
Participant demographic information (categorical variables)

Gender
Male
Female
Race
African American (or Black)
European American (or White)
Latino/Hispanic
Asian-American (including Pacific
Islander)
Other
Native American
Marital Status
Single
Married
Living with a partner
SCID Diagnosis
Schizophrenia
Schizoaffective Disorder
Research Site
Indiana Outpatient Clinic
Indiana VA Psychosocial
Rehabilitation Program
Newark Outpatient Clinic
Newark Partial Hospitalization
Program (PHP)
Piscataway PHP
Hospitalized within last three
months of baseline interview?
No
Yes
Missing

n

Percentage
(%)

68
48

58.6
41.4

77
26
5
3

66.4
22.4
4.3
2.6

3
2

2.6
1.7

97
13
6

83.6
11.2
5.2

75
41

64.7
35.3

28
25

24.1
21.6

23
22

19.8
19.0

18

15.5

103
10
3

88.8
8.6
2.6
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Table 3
Distribution of study variables

Beck Hopelessness Total Score
Coping with Symptoms
Checklist - Avoidant Coping
Coping with Symptoms
Checklist - Neutral Coping
Coping with Symptoms
Checklist - Problem-Centered
Coping
Global Work Rating4
Internalized Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale - Total Score4
Internalized Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale - Alienation
Subscale
Internalized Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale- Discrimination
Experience Subscale
Internalized Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale - Social
Withdrawal Subscale
Internalized Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale - Stereotype
Endorsement Subscale
PANSS 3 Factor General
Psychopathology Subscale
PANSS 3 Factor Negative
Subscale4
PANSS 3 Factor Positive
Subscale
Quality of Life Total Score
Quality of Life Scale Common
Objects and Activities Subscale
QLS Instrumental Subscale4
QLS Interpersonal Subscale
QLS Intrapsychic Subscale
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Total
Score
Scale to Assess Narrative

Time 1
Possible n
Range
0-1
116
0-3
108

Mean

SD

Time 2
n
Mean

0.49
1.46

0.31
0.53

114
97

0.44
1.43

0.32
0.50

SD

0-3

108

1.92

0.48

97

1.89

0.53

0-3

108

1.75

0.57

97

1.70

0.63

1-7
0-3

116
116

6.15
1.63

1.63
0.42

111
114

5.76
1.38

2.00
0.61

0-3

116

1.72

0.55

114

1.46

0.74

0-3

115

1.82

0.53

114

1.57

0.70

0-3

116

1.73

0.56

114

1.47

0.71

0-3

115

1.32

0.48

114

1.11

0.62

1-7

116

2.14

0.49

114

2.20

0.49

1-7

116

2.23

0.69

114

2.34

0.71

1-7

116

2.55

0.75

114

2.44

0.77

0-6
0-6

116
116

3.13
3.39

0.84
0.87

111
111

3.28
3.57

0.91
1.10

0-6
0-6
0-6
0-3

116
116
116
116

2.76
2.88
3.55
1.59

0.90
1.30
0.95
0.57

111
111
111
114

2.95
3.13
3.57
1.72

1.07
1.31
1.04
0.57

4-20

116

12.18

3.10

116

12.27

2.58
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Development Total Score3
Scale to Assess Narrative
1-5
116
3.19
0.94
116
3.30
Development - Agency
Scale to Assess Narrative
1-5
116
2.98
1.22
116
2.99
Development - Alienation
Scale to Assess Narrative
1-5
116
3.28
1.03
116
3.17
Development - Illness
Conception
Scale to Assess Narrative
1-5
116
2.72
0.96
116
2.81
Development - Social Worth
1
: Lower MSIF scores indicate more independent functioning
2
: The stigma resistance subscale of the ISMIS was excluded from the total ISMIS score
calculation
3
: Higher STAND scores correspond to improved personal narratives
4:
Denotes skewed variable as measured by skewness and kurtosis statistics z-scores ≥ |3|

0.87
1.07
0.94

0.81
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Table 4
Independent samples t-test comparing STAND mean scores by gender and marital status

Scale to Assess
Narrative
Development Total
Score (STAND)
STAND
Illness a
Conceptionb
STAND
Alienationb

Male
M (SD)
12.15
(3.20)

Female
M (SD)
12.21
(2.99)

3.26 (1.11)

3.32 (.90)

2.94 (1.19)

STAND Agencyb

3.25 (.93)

t

Married
M (SD)
13.08
(3.31)

Single
M (SD)
12.06
(12.06)

-.34

3.54 (.92)

3.03 (1.27)

-.39

3.12 (.95)

.76

-.12

t

df

1.11

114

3.25 (1.04)

.95

114

3.46 (1.45)

2.91 (1.18)

1.52

114

3.07 (1.09)

3.21 (.92)

-.48

114

STAND Social
2.69 (.94)
2.75 (981) -.28 3.00 (1.21) 2.68 (.92) 1.12 114
b
Worth
a
: STAND total scores range from 1-20, with higher scores reflecting more developed narratives
b
: STAND subscale scores range from 1-5, with higher scores reflecting improved narrative
functioning
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Table 5
Bivariate correlations between continuous demographic variables and STAND mean scores
STAND
Total
Age
Education
Age at first hospitalization
Total number of psychiatric
admissions
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05

STAND
Alienation

STAND
Agency

-.01
.30**
.08

STAND
Illness
Conception
-.08
.13
-.01

.02
.19*
.14

.04
.27**
.03

STAND
Social
Worth
-.02
.32**
.07

.08

.05

.02

.15

.05
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Table 6
Independent samples t-test comparing means for diagnostic differences in STAND scores

Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Total Score
(STAND)a
STAND Illness Conceptionb
STAND Alienationb
STAND Agencyb
STAND Social Worthb

Schizophrenia Schizoaffective
n=75
Disorder
M (SD)
n=41
M (SD)
11.79 (3.21)
12.88 (2.80)

t

df

-1.82*

114

3.15 (1.06)

3.52 (.94)

-1.88*

114

2.86 (1.26)
3.09 (.93)
2.69 (.96)

3.20 (1.13)
3.38 (94)
2.78 (.96)

-1.42
-1.57
-.50

114
114
114

Note: * denotes statically significant trend
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Table 7
Independent samples t-test comparing STAND scores by type of research site (day program
versus outpatient clinic)

Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Total Score
(STAND)
STAND Illness Conception
STAND Alienation
STAND Agency
STAND Social Worth

Day Program
(n = 65)
M (SD)
12.43 (2.75)

Outpatient
Clinic (n = 51)
M (SD)
11.85 (3.50)

t

df

-.12

114

3.37 (.99)

3.12 (1.08)

-.34

114

3.02 (1.19)
3.28 (.79)
2.76 (.91)

2.92 (1.26)
3.09 (1.10)
2.67 (1.03)

-.39
.76
-.28

114
114
114
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Table 8
Bivariate correlations of STAND scores at T1 to self-report measures at T1 and T2

STAND
Total
.01

STAND
Alienation
-.04

STAND
Agency
.05

STAND
STAND
Social
Illness
Worth Conception
-.05
.09

Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS)
Total Score
BHS Total Score Time 2
-.12
-.08
-.13
-.11
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale
.08
-.04
.17
.23*
Total Score
RSES Total Score Time 2
.03
-.04
.14
.12
Internalized Stigma Mental
-.14
.02
-.25*
-.11
Illness Scale (ISMIS) Total
Score1
ISMIS Total Score Time 21
-.22*
-.13
-.29**
-.20*
*
ISMIS Alienation Subscale
.02
.17
-.21
.03
ISMIS Alienation Subscale Time
-.09
-.03
-.13
-.11
2
ISMIS Discrimination
-.18
-.10
-.18
-.12
Experiences Subscale
ISMIS Discrimination
-.26**
-.20*
-.28**
-.17
Experience Subscale Time 2
ISMIS Social Withdrawal
-.04
.04
-.13
-.05
Subscale
ISMIS Social Withdrawal
-.13
-.07
-.20*
-.12
Subscale Time 2
ISMIS Stereotype Endorsement
-.19*
-.02
-.15
-.14
Subscale
ISMIS Stereotype Endorsement
-.32**
-.19*
-.32**
-.21*
Subscale Time 2
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
1
: Due to the non-normal distribution of the ISMIS total score variable, Spearman Rho
correlations were used.

-.06
-.06
-.08
-.13

-.12
.02
-.01
-.13
-.13
-.01
-.01
-.30**
-.24**
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Table 9
Bivariate correlations of STAND scores to coping scores
STAND
Total

STAND
Alienation

STAND
Agency

STAND
STAND
Social
Illness
Worth Conception
-.03
.06

CSC Avoidant Coping

.07

.09

.06

CSC Avoidant Coping Time 2

.08

.01

.19

-.10

.13

CSC Neutral Coping1

-.05

-.03

-.01

-.15

.01

CSC Neutral Coping Time 21

.25*

.22*

.17

.22*

.08

CSC Problem-Centered Coping
.17
.21*
.08
-.04
.21*
CSC Problem-Centered Coping
.32**
.17
.28**
.25*
.25*
Time 2
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
1
: Due to the non-normal distribution of the neutral coping variable, Spearman Rho correlations
were used.
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Table 10
Bivariate correlation of STAND scores to objective indicators of recovery
STAND
Total

STAND
Alienation

STAND STAND
STAND
Agency Social
Illness
Worth Conception

PANSS General
-.18
-.12
-.09
-.15
-.17
Psychopathology Subscale
PANSS General
-.17
.00
-.20*
-.26**
-.10
Psychopathology Subscale Time
2
PANSS Negative Symptoms
-.39**
-.25**
-.23*
-.33**
-.26**
1
Subscale
PANSS Negative Symptoms
-.30**
-.20*
-.15
-.30**
-.20*
1
Subscale Time 2
PANSS Positive Symptoms
-.22*
-.19*
-.14
-.10
-.21*
Subscale
PANSS Positive Symptoms
-.15
-.07
-.17
-.06
-.15
Subscale Time 2
QLS Common Objects and
.26**
.19*
.20*
.13
.26**
Activities Subscale
QLS Common Objects and
.30**
.27**
.16
.10
.35**
Activities Subscale Time 2
QLS Interpersonal Subscale
.22*
.12
.10
.21*
.24**
**
QLS Interpersonal Subscale Time .26
.18
.15
.17
.26**
2
QLS Intrapsychic Subscale
.28**
.26**
.13
.25**
.17
**
*
**
QLS Intrapsychic Subscale Time .31
.24
.15
.28
.23*
2
QLS Total Score
.30**
.21*
.16
.26**
.28**
QLS Total Score Time 2
.37**
.29**
.21*
.26**
.32**
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
1
: Due to the non-normal distribution of the negative symptoms variable, Spearman Rho
correlations were used.
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Table 11
Spearman rho correlations of STAND mean scores to work and QLS instrumental ratings
STAND
Total
Global Work Rating
Global Work Rating Time
2
QLS Instrumental
Subscale
QLS Instrumental
Subscale Time 2
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05

STAND
Agency

-.27**

STAND
STAND
Illness
Alienation
Conception
-.28**
-.13

-.17

STAND
Social
Worth
-.20*

-.31**

-.24*

-.24*

-.21*

-.19*

.28**

.22*

.15

.16

.20*

.37**

.28**

.30**

.25**

.21*
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Table 12
Paired samples t-test between narrative scores at Time 1 and Time 2 (n = 116)
Time
Baseline
M (SD)
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Total Score
(STAND)a
STAND Illness Conceptionb

12.17 (3.10)

PostTreatment
M (SD)
12.27 (2.58)

t

df

-.321

115

3.28 (1.03)

3.17 (.94)

1.09

115

STAND Alienationb
STAND Agencyb
STAND Social Worthb

2.98 (1.22)
3.19 (.94)
2.72 (.95)

2.98 (1.07)
3.30 (.87)
2.81 (.81)

-.07
-1.03
-.90

115
115
115

a: STAND total scores range from 1-20, with higher scores reflecting more developed narratives
b: STAND subscale scores range from 1-5, with higher scores reflecting improved narrative
functioning
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Table 13
ANOVA comparing STAND changes by intervention group (Narrative Cognitive Enhancement
Therapy vs. Supportive Therapy)
df

Mean Square

F

Scale to Assess Narrative Development
Change

1

.77

.76

STAND Illness Conception Change

1

.01

.01

STAND Alienation Change

1

1.72

1.72

STAND Agency Change

1

.19

.19

STAND Social Worth Change

1

.03

.03

Note: Residualized change scores were computed for each STAND variable to control for the
level of baseline performance. Two cases that were not randomized to the NECT or supportive
therapy conditions were excluded from this analysis.
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Table 14
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting T2 self-esteem (n = 114)

Rosenberg Self Esteem
Scale Time 1
Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Scale Time 1
R2

B
.80

Note: ***p < .001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Model 1
SE B
β
.13
.59***

B
.54
-.13

.35***

Model 2
SE B
.08
.11
.35***

β
.55***
-.10
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Table 15
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting the use of problem-centered coping strategies at
Time 2 (n = 95)
Model 1
B SE B
Coping with Symptoms
Checklist – Problem
Centered Coping Time 1
PANSS General
Psychopathology Time 1
PANSS Positive
Symptoms Time 1
PANSS Negative
Symptoms Time 1
Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Time 1
Beck Hopelessness
Score Time 1
Group Assignment
(NECT or Supportive
Therapy)a
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
(STAND) Total Time 1
STAND – Alienation
STAND – Agency
STAND – Illness
Conception
STAND – Social Worth

.59

.11

.25

.19

.01

β
.51***

Model 2
B
SE B

Model 3
β
B
SE
B
.46***
.58
.11

β

.53

.11

.18

.13

.19

.10

.15

.19

.11

.11

.01

.07

.11

.09

.03

.11

.03

.18
.17

.09

-.20*

-.07

.10

-.08

-.06

.10

-.07

.14

.11

.20

.14

.13

.25

.14

.17

.16

.21

.07

.08

.20

.04

.06

.2

.03

.18

.12

.14

.19

.12

.15

.19

.12

.15

.06

.02

.26*

--

--

.-.04
.10
.04

.05
.08
.07

.16

.07

R2
.32
.37
41
F for change in R2
5.90***
6.81*
2.94*
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
a: NECT group assignment was coded as “0” and the support condition was coded as “1”

.51***

--

-.07
.14
.06
.22*
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Table 16
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting the use of avoidant-centered coping strategies at
Time 2 (n=95)

Coping with Symptoms
Checklist – Avoidant
Coping Time 1
PANSS General
Psychopathology Time 1
PANSS Positive
Symptoms Time 1
PANSS Negative
Symptoms Time 1
Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Time 1
Beck Hopelessness Score
Time 1
Group Assignment
(NECT or Supportive
Therapy)a
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Alienation
Time 1
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Agency
Time 1

Model 1
B
SE B

β

0.37

0.09

0.33

Model 2
B

SE B

β

0.39*** 0.35

0.09

0.38***

0.14

0.31*

0.27

0.14

0.25

-0.11

0.08

-0.16

-0.10

0.09

-0.15

-0.05

0.07

-0.07

-0.02

0.07

-0.03

0.23

0.11

0.19*

0.30

0.12

0.25*

0.32

0.16

0.19*

0.27

0.16

0.16

0.08

0.09

0.08

0.07

0.09

0.07

-0.04

0.04

-0.11

0.11

0.05

0.20*

R2

.37

.41

F for change in R2

7.44***

2.57

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
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Table 17
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting the use of neutral coping strategies at Time 2(n=95)

Coping with Symptoms
Checklist – Neutral Coping
Time 1
PANSS General
Psychopathology Time 1
PANSS Positive Symptoms
Time 1
PANSS Negative
Symptoms Time 1
Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Time 1
Beck Hopelessness Score
Time 1
Group Assignment (NECT
or Supportive Therapy)a
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Total Score
Time 1
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Illness
Conception Time 1
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Alienation
Time 1
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Agency Time
1
Scale to Assess Narrative
Development STAND
Social Worth Time 1

Model 1
B
SE B

β

Model 2
B
SE B

β

Model 3
B
SE B

β

0.45

0.10

0.41***

0.46

0.10

0.42***

0.47

0.10

0.43***

0.22

0.16

0.19

0.13

0.16

0.11

0.10

0.16

0.09

-0.05

0.10

-0.07

0.01

0.09

0.01

0.00

0.10

0.00

-0.23

0.08

-0.30*** -0.13 0.08

-0.16

-0.12 0.08

-0.16

0.25

0.12

0.20*

0.28

0.11

0.22*

0.27

0.12

0.21*

0.24

0.17

0.13

0.16

0.17

0.09

0.16

0.17

0.09

0.18

0.10

0.17

0.19

0.10

0.18

0.19

0.10

0.17

0.06

0.02

0.31***

--

--

--

-0.04 0.06

-0.07

0.06

0.04

0.13

0.14

0.06

0.23*

0.08

0.06

0.14

R2

.30

.38

.40

F for change in R2

5.39***

10.34**

3.45*

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
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Table 18
Bivariate correlations between residual change in coping scores from baseline to follow-up and
residual change in personal narrative scores (n=96)
STAND
Agency
Change

STAND
Alienation
Change

STAND Illness
Conception
Change

STAND
Social Worth
Change

STAND
Total Change

Avoidant
Coping Change

-0.09

-0.22*

-0.09

-0.06

-0.19

Neutral Coping
Change

0.09

-0.13

0.13

0.03

-0.01

0.17

-0.01

0.12

-0.03

0.05

Problem
Centered
Coping Change
Note:*p < .05
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Table 19
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting the hopelessness at Time 2(n=112)
Model 1
B
SE B
Beck Hopelessness
0.34
Score Time 1
PANSS General
Psychopathology
0.06
Time 1
PANSS Negative
0.05
Symptoms Time 1
PANSS Positive
-0.01
Symptoms Time 1
Internalized Stigma
of Mental Illness
0.1
Time 1
Rosenberg Self
-0.14
Esteem Scale Time 1
Group Assignment
(NECT or
0
Supportive
Therapy)a
Scale to Assess
Narrative
Development
(STAND) Total
Score Time 1
STAND Illness
Conception

Model 2
B
SE B

β

β

β

0.35

0.33***

0.09 0.32***

0.35

0.09

0.09

0.07

0.1

0.1

0.07

0.1

0.1

0.04

0.1

0.04

0.05

0.08

0.04

0.05

0.08

-0.01 -0.01

0.06

-0.03 -0.02

0.06

-0.03

0.1

0.08

0.13

-0.25* -0.15

0.06

-0.25*

0.06
0.07

0.14

0.09 0.33***

Model 3
B
SE B

0.1

0.08

0.06

-0.24** -0.14

0.06

0.06

0

0.06

0

-0.01

STAND Alienation
STAND Agency
STAND Social
Worth
R2

.27

.27

F Change in R2

5.58***

.33

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

0.01

0.13

0

0.09

0

0.06

0

--

--

--

-.00

.03

0

-0.02

.03

-0.06

-0.02

.04

-0.05

0.02

.04

0.05

-0.05

.28
.21
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Table 20
Bivariate correlations between residual change in hopelessness from baseline to follow-up and
residual change in personal narrative scores (n=114)
STAND
Agency
Change
Beck Hopelessness
BHS Change

0.02

STAND
STAND
Illness
Alienation
Conception
Change
Change
-0.18

0.02

STAND
Social
Worth
Change

STAND
Total
Change

-0.15

-0.09
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Table 21
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting objective quality of life at Time 2 (n=109)
Model 1
B
SE B

β

Model 2
B
SE B

Quality of Life Total
Score Time 1
Beck Hopelessness
Score Time 1
PANSS General
Psychopathology Time
1
PANSS Negative
Symptoms Time 1
PANSS Positive
Symptoms Time 1
Rosenberg Self Esteem
Scale Time 1
Group assignment
(NECT or Supportive)
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
Total Score Time 1
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
Illness Conception
Time 1
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
Alienation Score Time
1
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
Agency Score Time 1
Scale to Assess
Narrative Development
Social Worth Score
Time 1
R2

0.48

0.51

F Change in R2

13.47***

4.43*

β
0.62*
0.10
**

0.72

0.10 0.66***

0.67

0.17

0.23 0.06

0.08

0.23

-0.06

0.23 -0.03

-0.15

-0.08

0.11 -0.06

0.01

β

0.67

0.62***

0.10

0.09

0.24

0.03

0.23

-0.07 -0.14

0.24

-0.07

-0.03

0.12

-0.02 -0.04

0.12

-0.03

0.13 0.01

0.07

0.13

0.08

0.13

0.07

-0.05

0.13 -0.03

-0.05

0.13

-0.03 -0.03

0.14

-0.02

-0.07

0.14 -0.04

-0.07

0.14

-0.04 -0.06

0.14

-0.03

0.05

0.02

0.17*
--

--

--

0.05

0.08

0.06

0.09

0.06

0.12

0.03

0.09

0.03

0.01

0.09

0.01

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

0.03

Model 3
B
SE B

0.05

0.51
1.23
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Table 22
Regression analyses predicting the four subscales of the Heinrichs Quality of Life at Time 2
(QLS) scale (n = 109)
QLS Interpersonal Subscale
R2

Model
1a
Model
2b

df

F

F
Change

0.43 10,98 7.40** 7.40**
0.44 11,97 6.86** 1.26
QLS Intrapsychic Subscale
R2

Model
1a
Model
2b

df

F

F
Change

0.39 10,98 6.30** 6.30**
0.41 11,97 6.10** 2.93
QLS Instrumental Subscale
R2

Model
1a
Model
2b

df

F

F
Change

0.28 10,98 3.84** 3.84**
0.31 11,97 3.89** 3.48
QLS Common Objects and
Activities
R2

df

F

F
Change

Model
0.43 10,98 7.25** 7.25**
1a
Model
0.43 11,97 6.66** 0.82
2b
Note: **p<.001, *p<.01
a: The following baseline covariates were entered in this step – QLS interpersonal, QLS
intrapsychic, QLS instrumental, QLS common objects and activities, Rosenberg Self Esteem
Scale, Beck Hopelessness Scale, PANSS General Psychopathology, PANSS Positive Symptoms,
PANSS Negative Symptoms, and group assignment (NECT or supportive therapy).
b. Scale to Assess Narrative Development at Time 1 was added to the regression model.
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Table 23
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting work functioning at Time 2 (n = 111)

Global Work Rating Time 1
Beck Hopelessness Score Time 1
PANSS General Psychopathology
Time 1
PANSS Negative Symptoms Time
1
PANSS Positive Symptoms Time
1
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale Time
1
Group Assignment

Model 1
Model 2
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
0.63
0.11 0.51***
0.58
0.11 0.47***
0.41
0.58
0.06
0.51
0.58
0.08
-0.04

0.60

-0.01

0.15

0.61

0.04

0.21

0.27

0.07

0.05

0.28

0.02

0.19

0.34

0.07

0.06

0.35

0.02

-0.14

0.34

-0.04

-0.09

0.33

-0.03

-0.17

0.36

-0.04

-0.17

0.35

-0.04

-0.11

0.06

-0.16

Scale to Assess Narrative
Development Total Score Time 1

R2
F Change in R2
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

.28

.30

5.61***

3.04
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Table 24
Bivariate correlations between residual change in interpersonal and vocational ratings from
baseline to follow-up and residual change in personal narrative scores (n=111)
Change in
Scale to
Assess
Narrative
Development Change in
(STAND)
STAND
Agency
Alienation
Change in
Multidimensional Scale of
Independent Functioning Global Work Ratinga
Change in Heinrichs
Quality of Life (QLS)
Common Objects and
Activities Subscaleb
Change in QLS
Instrumental Subscale
Change in QLS
Interpersonal Subscale
Change QLS Intrapsychic
Subscale
Change in QLSTotal Score
Note: *p<.05

Change in
STAND
Illness
Conception

Change in
STAND
Social
Worth

Change
in
STAND
Total
Score

0.02

-.20*

0.09

-.24*

-0.10

0.12

0.17

0.02

0.13

0.15

0.02

0.12

-0.07

.22*

0.08

.23*

0.13

.22*

0.01

.22*

0.12

0.09

0.16

0.04

0.14

.20*

0.16

.19*

0.08

.22*

a: MSIF Global Work Rating: lower scores reflect better work performance
b: Heinrichs Quality of Life: higher scores reflect improved functioning
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Table 25
Hierarchical regression analysis with T1 self-stigma predicting T2 work functioning (n=95)
Model 1
B
SE B
.63 .10
.94 .38

Global Work Rating Time 1
Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Scale Time 1
R2
.29
F Change in R2
23.65***
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

β
.51***
.20*
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Table 26
Hierarchical regression analysis predicting STAND Agency at T1 (n=95)
Model 1
B
SE
B
-.49 .21

Internalized Stigma of
Mental Illness Scale Time 1
R2
.04
F Change in R2
5.62*
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

β
-.22*
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Table 27
Hierarchical regression analysis with T1 STAND agency predicting T2 work functioning
(n=95)
Model 1
B
SE B
Global Work Rating T1
.62 .10
STAND Agency
-.20 .18
2
R
.27
F Change in R2
20.23***
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

β
.50***
-.09

STAND subscale mean scores
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5
4.5
4
3.5
3

Baseline

2.5

Post-Treatment

2
1.5
1

STAND
STAND
Illness
Alienation
Conception

STAND
Agency

STAND
Social
Worth

Figure 1: STAND subscale scores at baseline and at post-treatment.
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T1 STAND
Agency

T1 Self-stigma
total score

β = .20, p < .05

T2 Global work
rating

Figure 2: Proposed mediation model of the self-experience between internalized mental health
stigma and employment status.
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